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This thesis asks the question: “how can the concepts of governance and social capital 
contribute to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to further expose a society’s vulnerabilities 
and subsequent susceptibility towards hybrid threats”. By using the concepts of hybrid threats (HT) 
together with governance and social capital (SC) in the aspect of democracy, this thesis looks at the 
conflict in Crimea and Ukraine since 2014 to analyse and discuss this question. The analytical 
framework from the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) report is used as 
the main framework for understanding HT. Through the case study, this thesis found that Ukraine 
has several challenges in terms of governance and SC, which made it easier for Russia to conduct 
its operations in Crimea and east Ukraine.  
The case study exposed two ways in which the concepts of governance and SC can expose a 
society’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards HT. Firstly, already existing challenges in a 
society and in the social relations in that society, can expose and influence other vulnerabilities, 
which can be exploited in HT. Secondly, governance and SC influence a society’s ability to respond 
and counter HT. This affects the efficiency of HT operations and the extent of their effects.  
The thesis concluded with a set of questions as a guideline for how to assess a society’s 
governance and SC situation. The questions may give an idea of the situation, which can then be 
used as a baseline assessment, contributing to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to expose a 
society’s possible vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT. The idea is that a 
deeper understanding of the societal and civilian aspects in HT might give a better understanding 
and ability to counter HT. Further testing and development of such a framework, requires more 
research, which is beyond the limits of this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis hopes to serve as a basis 
for further research on governance and SC in the context of HT. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Hybrid threats: a study on societal-focused threats 
When we think of war, we may think of weapons, military operations, casualties, 
revolutions, and brutal changes in governments. These are very visible elements and aspects of war. 
Through this thesis, the argument is that it is also important to look into what might not always be 
so visible in war and other conflicts – namely the societal and civilian aspects. This thesis aims at 
understanding how the concepts of governance and social capital can contribute to further expose a 
society’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards hybrid threats. In this thesis, three main concepts 
are at the centre: 1) hybrid threats, 2) governance, and 3) social capital. Hybrid threats (HT) is 
described by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE)1 as 
“methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent. If the interests 
and goals of the user of hybrid methods and activity are not achieved, the situation can escalate 
into hybrid warfare where the role of military and violence will increase significantly.” Chapter 2 
will go further into the discussion on the meaning of the three main concepts. 
Combining various military and non-military methods/elements and activities, as well as 
exploiting vulnerabilities in society is nothing new to warfare. Such has been the case throughout 
history, from the Trojan horse in the battle of Troy to the activities of the USA against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015:1, Popescu 2015). However, the 
more recent developments around the concept of HT has led to a further focus on the societal and 
civilian aspects of war and conflict. Since the conflict in Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, 
and the subsequent investigation of Russia’s interference in the US elections in 2016, the civilian 
sphere (the population) as a target has become more widely discussed (Chivvis 2017, Harding 
2016). NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme has funded a specific project at the 
Centre of Peace Studies, UiT on studying HW with the focus on the civilian and societal aspects 
(High North News 2018). 
It is this departure point – the civilian and societal aspect of HT – from which this thesis 
draws. I have previously examined the different ways in which governance and social capital have 
an influence on how smaller communities can cope with globalisation and will build on this 
knowledge by examining the relevance of the same concepts to the complex realm of HT. Briefly, 
governance pertains to the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine 
how power is exercised in a society (Plumptre and Graham 1999:3). Social capital addresses 
                                                 
1 The Hybrid CoE is an international hub for practitioners and experts aimed to assist member states and institutions in 





features of social organisation, through concepts like trust, norms and networks influence social 
dynamics (drawing on Putnam’s research in 1993). Both these concepts will be further explained 
and discussed in chapter 2.  
During the research on HT, I realised that many of the ideas and concepts on governance 
and social capital could be relevant for understanding how vulnerabilities in societies can make 
them more susceptible to tactics and strategies used in HT. In sense, this thesis focuses on HT by 
looking at those who are targeted by the these threats rather than on the opponent who exercises 
these threats. It is important for us to ask not only why and how actors conduct HT, but also to ask 
what about the target enables them to do so. What are the vulnerabilities in society that makes us 
potentially susceptible to HT, why do they exist, and how do we reduce them? Our own 
vulnerabilities are at least as important (if not more) than the enemies’ ability to exploit them. 
 
1.2 Research question and methodology 
The research question in this thesis is “how can the concepts of governance and social 
capital contribute to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to further expose a society’s 
vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT?” The concepts of governance and social 
capital invite many questions and issues on what type of governance and social capital, how one 
defines these concepts, how to measure them, as well as how are they implemented in the concept 
of HT, to mention a few. How one understands HT is also an important issue. There are several 
articles centred on the exploitation of societal vulnerabilities aspect in HT with different 
understandings on HT. In this thesis, I chose to look deeper into the framework from the 
Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) report2, written by Cullen and 
Reichborn-Kjennerud from NUPI (2017). The report has been significant and instrumental to the 
discussions taking place in NATO as well as amongst other countries. In this report, the term hybrid 
warfare (HW) is used instead of HT. Chapter 2 will discuss the differences and relevance of HW 
and HT. Nonetheless, the report’s focus on societal vulnerabilities, and its analytical framework on 
how HW attacks can be conceptualised, can be transferred to the description of HT. Further, their 
framework gives a visual representation for monitoring HW, which is transferable to various cases 
of HW and HT. This will be discussed in chapter 2 and 3. The main argument is that their 
framework offers the ability to incorporate the concepts of governance and social capital. This is 
why the research question in this thesis is based on the MCDC-report and seeks to contribute to this 
report. Chapter 3 will explain the MCDC-report and discuss how it is relevant for this thesis. 
                                                 
2 This thesis refers to the report by Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud as the MCDC-report, while their Baseline 




This thesis is based on qualitative research method based on literary review. Specifically, 
this thesis:  
1. Explores the three concepts: hybrid threats, governance and social capital  
2. Looks in-depth at the MCDC-report 
3. Looks at one case study – the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine 
4. Analyses and critically compares the theory from point 1 and 2 with the empirical case 
in point 3 to gain an understanding of how the concepts of governance and social capital 
can contribute to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to further expose a society’s 
vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT. 
Throughout this thesis, I seek to build upon the MCDC-report and gain a deeper 
understanding on how HT can be understood through governance and social capital. 
 
1.2.1 Research material and structure of the thesis 
While it is not possible to remove all subjectivity when selecting which scholarly sources to 
use, I have attempted to gather literature from a wide range of sources, including journals, article, 
and reports from The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, The 
Norwegian Defence Collage, as well as syllabus from other institutions and universities. Thus, this 
study relies upon a comprehensive literature review and analysis. This thesis is structured into six 
chapters. Below is a brief summary of each chapter and the research material/sources used in them. 
Chapter 2 is this thesis’s theoretical framework, presenting and discussing the three main 
concepts in this thesis. This should give the reader the theoretical background for the HT framewok 
in chapter 3, the case study in chapter 4 and the analysis in chapter 5. HT and the concept’s 
relevancy to this thesis’s topic will be further discussed, before presenting governance and social 
capital (SC). There is a lot of literature on governance and SC and the main discussions in this 
chapter are based on reviewing the debates and criticism that has been central in these subjects.  
Chapter 3 will look into the MCDC report’s description of HW (here adapted to HT) before 
looking at the analytical framework they use to conceptualise and visualise hybrid threats. The 
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) also focuses on 
vulnerabilities in societies and I use some of their literature in this thesis. However, the analytical 
framework in the MCDC-report is used as the main framework for understanding HT. 
Chapter 4 presents this thesis’s case study on the conflict in Crimea and east Ukraine from 
2014 and onwards. In addition to giving a brief overview of the conflict, this chapter looks at 
governance and social capital in Ukraine. The conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was chosen 
due to the accessibility of literature on not just the HT aspect but regarding to literature on 




Ukraine, have been studied in terms of governance and SC. This chapter is based on some of these 
studies from the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. 
Chapter 5 is the main analytical part of this thesis. It first discusses the case study from 
chapter 4 through the MCDC-report’s analytical framework. Through that section, we will see how 
the Ukraine case is analysed in the MCDC-reports model. Afterwards, I analyse the findings in the 
Ukraine case from chapter 4 and see how the concepts of governance and SC overall can expose a 
society’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards HT. Here, the theory with the empirical aspects 
come together to critically analyse and discuss this thesis’s research question. Lastly, I provide a 
suggestion for possible questions to assess governance and SC in a society and how one can create a 
baseline assessment for governance and social capital in the context of HT. 




























CHAPTER TWO – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we will look at the theoretical framework, which encompasses this thesis’ 
three main concepts: 1) hybrid threats, 2) governance, and 3) social capital (SC). The chapter begins 
by discussing how this thesis explains hybrid threats (HT), before discussing the other two 
concepts. It is important to note that governance and social capital are not separate elements. They 
are interconnected. Nevertheless, this chapter is structured to present the concept of governance 
before presenting the concept of social capital. 
 
2.2 Defining hybrid threats 
The introduction chapter gave a simplistic explanation of the concepts hybrid warfare (HW) 
and hybrid threats (HT). In this section, the concept will be further explained in relation to the topic 
of this thesis, as well as providing a reason for using the concept HT and not HW in this thesis. 
Looking back to the Hybrid CoE’s description of hybrid threats, they write the following: “Hybrid 
threats are methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent. 
Vulnerabilities can be created by many things, including historical memory, legislation, old 
practices, geostrategic factors, strong polarisation of society, technological disadvantages or 
ideological differences. If the interests and goals of the user of hybrid methods and activity are not 
achieved, the situation can escalate into hybrid warfare where the role of military and violence will 
increase significantly”.3 
Further more the Hybrid CoE characterises hybrid threat as: 
- “Coordinated and synchronised action that deliberately targets democratic states’ and 
institutions systemic vulnerabilities, through a wide range of means. 
- The activities exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution as well as the different 
interfaces (war-peace, internal-external, local-state, national-international, friend-enemy). 
- The aim of the activity is to influence different forms of decision making at the local 
(regional), state, or institutional level to favour and/or gain the agent’s strategic goals while 
undermining and/or hurting the target.” 
In relation to HW, both HW and HT involve the issue of mixing military and non-military, 
conventional and irregular components, and using various elements, among other economic, 
political, cyber and information elements, to achieve certain objectives by targeting vulnerabilities 
in a society. Both concepts are widely used in articles and reports from NATO, and western think 
                                                 




tanks (e.g. RAND corporation and FFI - Norwegian Defence Research Establishment), as well as in 
media. However, this thesis argues that there is a certain distinction. With the word warfare in HW, 
the activity of conducting war/armed conflict4 is involved. This implies kinetic actions, meaning 
conducting warfare through the application of physical force (Hurley et al. 2009:ES-1, 3-4).  
In this thesis, I use the concept HT because I focus on the non-kinetic aspects of conflict. In 
Hybrid CoE’s description of HT, the term threats implies that we are dealing with any threats that 
target vulnerabilities in a society. Hybrid CoE focuses much less on the military and kinetic aspects 
in HT, and through their description one can interpret it in a way that HT is a precursor to HW. This 
thesis argues that HT as a concept can include both kinetic warfare as well as existing or potential 
threats that are non-kinetic (where physical force is not applied), and that this can be further 
escalated to include more kinetic warfare. An example in the Ukraine case was where unidentifiable 
soldiers patrolled Crimea without using physical force. These soldier were anonymous, with no 
insignias, and one could not assign their origin other than not being part of Ukraine’s military 
forces. The lack of physical force used together with the lack of identity made it difficult to 
categorise the actions as kinetic or non-kinetic force. Nevertheless, this thesis does not focus on to 
which degree the activities in a conflict constitute a “threat” or “war” phase. Using the term HT 
avoids the discussion of what degree of military elements are needed to distinguish a case from a 
non-military/non-kinetic conflict to military/kinetic conflict. HT signifies the possible threats that 
can arise and/or are conducted without war taking place. In this thesis, the argument is that HT is a 
more versatile and open concept for assessing potential threats that are discussed in this thesis. 
Some reports define HW through descriptions including both kinetic and non-kinetic features. The 
MCDC-report’s description of HW (as will be further explored in chapter 3) is such. In this thesis, 
the term HT will be consequently used and when discussing the MCDC-report’s analytical 
framework, the concept HT will be used, even though they use the concept HW in their report. 
Because of their description (as will be discussed in chapter 3), this will not have any functional 
consequences to the topic of this thesis. Likewise, while some of the literature referred to in this 
thesis uses the concept HW, the concept HT will be used consequently instead because for the 
purpose of this thesis and in the context it is used, the difference is not relevant. 
The focus on non-kinetic warfare does not mean excluding the military when focusing on 
the aspect of society in HT. The military is a tool of the state, but it is also a product of society. 
How the military is part of society and how it is shaped by society also influences how conflicts can 
                                                 
4 War can be defined as an armed conflict between states or nations (Meeriam-webster dictionary website). The 
classification of war can be measured by the number of battle-related deaths as Uppsala University’s definition on their 
website: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Warring_party_2. Warfare is defined as the activity and 





develop. As such, militaries can also be analysed sociologically as social entities in conflict, and 
how they interact with the civilian entities in conflict. This will be illustrated in section 2.3 on 
governance.  
Regarding the societal aspect in the topic of this thesis, HT is relevant because of the focus 
on targeting vulnerabilities in society. In conventional warfare an example could be that state A 
uses its military to fight state B’s military to subject state B and its population to state A’s 
demands/desired goal. In HT, an example could be that state A uses either an already existing 
crisis/tense situation or creates one (e.g. with its own military or by using third parties) and then 
applies disinformation campaigns coordinated with economic and political games to undermine 
state B by turning its own population against it. In addition, HT allows for ambiguity, uncertainties 
and confusions for whether the attack is an attack and from whom etc. which can further be 
exploited by the attacker. Especially in (but not limited to) democratic countries in which the 
population has more power to influence the government, targeting the population to undermine the 
government can be more efficient than by solely targeting the opponent’s military to undermine the 
opponent’s sovereignty. Thereby, HT can potentially allow for achieving more with less resources 
and less political risk for the attacker.  
However, mixing various military and non-military methods/elements and activities, as well 
as exploiting vulnerabilities in society is nothing new in the history of warfare. Such has been the 
case throughout history, from the Trojan horse to US’ counterinsurgency (COIN) operations during 
the Cold War and today (Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015:1, Popescu 2015, Clemis 2009:164-178). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the concept HT has led to a further focus on the societal and 
civilian aspects of war and conflict. In chapter 3, I discuss what changes have occurred in the battle 
scene today as compared to before. 
The issue of targeting the vulnerabilities in a society poses the questions of how we 
understand vulnerabilities and what issues in society can constitute vulnerabilities. Understanding 
how society functions and how different societal features can in certain circumstances become 
vulnerabilities, may prove be a valuable asset in understanding and countering HT. One method in 
doing so, which is the main topic of this thesis, is to assess society through governance and social 
capital. In the next sections, the theoretical frameworks of the concepts governance and social 










Governance has, like many concepts in social sciences, various connotations and 
descriptions. Looking at previous research on governance in the context of local communities and 
aboriginal perspectives, there is a lot of literature on relevance of governance in the sustainability of 
communities. In Plumptre and Graham’s (1999) research on governance in international and 
aboriginal perspectives, they discuss this but also note the overall similarities in what governance 
refers to. One way to look at it is as the art of steering societies5 and organisations. Governance 
involves the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power is 
exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say (ibid:3). 
Similarly, Healey (1997:206) describes governance as involving the articulation of rules of 
behaviour with respect to the collective affairs of a political community; and of principles for 
allocating resources among community members. In other words, how the processes through which 
collective affairs are managed in a society or community (ibid). In their book on global governance, 
Barnett and Duvall (2004:2) wrote that governance involves the rules, structures, and institutions 
that guide, regulate, and control social life, features that are fundamental elements of power.  
From these descriptions, we can understand governance as a process not confined to 
government but existing in all social organisations. It is about the interaction of governments and 
other social organisations, how they relate to citizens, and how decisions are made (Plumptre and 
Graham 1999). In this sense, it is also important to differentiate between government and 
governance. Plumptre and Graham (ibid) define government as an institution or a set of institutions 
– it is one of several societal players in society in which decision-making is manifested, whether 
through representation (e.g. in democracy) or through the leaders in the said institute(s). Simplified, 
government is only one type of institution(s) in which governance works with and within. 
Moreover, the concepts governance and government are not confined to democracy but include any 
kind of political system from liberal democracy to authoritarian regimes. Referring to the three 
previously given descriptions of governance, all political systems, regardless of type, involve some 
rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and control social life as well as determine 
how power is exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their 
say (whether this is free or highly limited). 
Government as an institution is also comprised of several institutions in itself as government 
can be divided into different entities (legislative, executive, judiciary as well as different 
                                                 
5 Society as a group of people can be anything from a collective group of people (e.g. in some indigenous communities). 
However, in this thesis I am narrowing it down to modern state societies that constitute some form of formal institutions 




departments under these entities) which each may have influences (depending on the political 
system and how it is practiced) in decision making and the overall governance of issues in society.  
In addition to government and its public institutions, there are other players in society that 
have a role in decision making. In Plumptre and Graham’s (1999:4) studies on governance related 
to aboriginal perspectives, they divided society into four spheres/sectors, 1) government/public 





In this illustration, we see that besides the government/public institutions, the private sector 
(private businesses both local and international), media, and civil society (e.g. through voluntary 
organisations or protests but also many other activities) also have an influence on the governance of 
a society. An example can be if people protest against a new law and media presents this, which in 
turn pressures the government to revoke the new law. Another example can be private businesses 
that lobby their own interests through media as well as through politicians. These are just examples 
illustrating the notion of “checks and balances” - not only within governments but also the 
influential power that the other sectors have over the government in democratic governance. In 
short, governments are not the only decision makers in a democratic society. Another factor is that 
the collective governance in society – the total function of all these players in society together – can 
work together efficiently to various degrees. As such when we talk about vulnerabilities in society 
we are not just talking about whether a government, media, or the private sector in a society is 
functioning well. We are also talking about whether these players are functioning well together.  
As explained in the introduction (chapter 1), HT is about taking advantage of the opponent’s 
societal vulnerabilities. Even more so, it plays on the range of players in society. Herein, lies the 
role of governance. If the players in a society are not functioning well together, a HT attacker may 




that society as a whole to achieve its objectives. Overall, the idea is that if governance of a specific 
society is well-functioning, it may be more difficult for an opponent to find and exploit certain 
vulnerabilities. Likewise, societies with less well-functioning governance may facilitate for more 
vulnerabilities. 
So what does well-functioning governance look like? This is a very complex question and 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this thesis looks into some of the concepts that constitute 
governance and what consequences might be for different degrees of these concepts. In Plumptre 
and Graham (ibid:3), they boil governance down to three concepts: 1) power – who has influence, 
2) relationships – who decides, and 3) accountability – how decision-makers are held accountable. 
How and why these concepts can be useful to understand governance will be discussed in the next 
sections of this chapter.  
 
2.3.1 An introduction to the concepts power, relationships and accountability 
If governance is about the processes of interactions and influence, then power as an act of 
influence is crucial. Max Weber’s famous definition of power is “the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability exists” (Barnett and Duvall 2004:13). Another 
influential definition is from Robert Dahl in which “power is the ability of A to get B to do what B 
otherwise would not do” (ibid). From these two definitions we can understand power as an act of 
influence within social relations. In their book, Barnett and Duvall (2004:8) conceptualise power as 
“the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to 
determine their own circumstances and fate”. As they explain (ibid:8-9), this definition represents 
two analytical dimensions: 1) the kinds of social relations through which power works, and 2) the 
specificity of social relations through which effects on actors’ capacities are produced.  
Barnett and Duvall (ibid:8-23) go deep into the discussion and analysis of these two 
analytical dimensions of power. However, what is relevant to this thesis is the understanding that 
power is a social relational phenomenon – e.i. it cannot exist in a social vacuum. This brings us to 
the concept of relationships. Power as such is not just about who has influence and relationship is 
not just about who decides (referring to Plumptre and Graham’s concepts 1999:3). Power and 
relations are also about how the subjects (we as humans) manoeuvre through life in the organisation 
of society – how we as individuals (as much as how society as a whole) solve certain tasks to 
sustain themselves. In a society as shown in figure 1, citizens manoeuvre through these four spheres 
– they may go to public school, use both public and private health systems, work in the private 




Much like Foucault’s view on power as a system, a network of relations encompassing the 
whole society, rather than a relation between the oppressed and the oppressor (Balan 2010:56), 
Barnett and Duvall (2004:8-23) describe power through the ways it is relational to the subjects 
involved. At the same time, according to Foucault (Balan 2010:56), individuals are not just objects 
of power; they are the locus where the power and the resistance to it are exerted. Thus, throughout 
this thesis, the two concepts (power and relationships) will be used together – power-relations or 
power-relationships. The argument here is that this is what we are talking about in governance. We 
are talking about how power is shared and how it is exercised through these relationships. An 
example being the power-relationships between the four spheres in figure 1. 
In this sense, power alone is not a positive nor negative phenomenon in itself – it depends on 
how it works in relation to those involved. Two governments, in each of their own country may 
have the same power to both protect their populations and use force (e.g. police) against those not 
behaving according to its laws. However, whether the populations accept and legitimise their 
government’s power is another issue. This is why the power-relationships, or how the influence is 
exerted, matters. In democracy, ultimately it is the population that decides through formal (e.g. 
voting) and informal (e.g. protests) influence. As mentioned in section 2.1, societies in which the 
population has more power to influence the government, targeting the population to undermine the 
government can be more efficient than by solely targeting the opponent’s military to undermine the 
opponent’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, in authoritarian societies, the population is not an isolated 
entity with no influence. They may still have influence (directly or indirectly), and in some cases 
the population can take down the government such as in revolutions, like the French in 1789 and the 
Russian in 1917 (Palmer et al, 2002:343-363, 697-719). 
Power-relationships can, among other things, be affected by accountability. In Plumptre and 
Graham (1999), they view accountability as how decision-makers are held accountable. This is 
done in the context of democratic political systems. Many studies on governance are in the context 
of democracy in which legitimacy, transparency, representation and (thereby) accountability are 
important factors in governance (Newman 2005, Sørensen and Torfing 2007, Healey 1997, 
Plumptre and Graham 1999). Barnett and Duvall (2004:305-306) also tie accountability to the 
ownership of decision making, involving people having more access or being more included in the 
decision making in society. Based on this, the thesis argues here that accountability is a factor in 
countries where the people in society are already used to a governance system based on some 
degree of legitimacy and transparency – they feel an ownership to their society. Møller and 
Skaaning (2012:36-37) differentiate between vertical accountability as the power between people 
and the state (e.g. in elections), and horizontal accountability as the balance of power within the 




relationships, which can reduce the population’s rights. One could say that in the context of HT and 
vulnerabilities, such changes in the accountability of society could pose as a vulnerability to the 
stability and susceptibility. The case study in this thesis is on a constitutionally democratic country 
(Ukraine). In that regard, the governance structure in this thesis will be focused on the aspect of 
representative and liberal democracy and use the concept accountability even though it is 
recognised that the practice of this type of governance may differ from the ideological and 
sometimes constitutional structure of this type of governance. This will be shown in chapter 4 on 
how Ukraine’s political system differs from the ideal principles in liberal democracy.  
The power-relationship between the government and the people is not the only factor in 
conflict. Figure 1 in the governance section illustrated one way of structuring a society. It is also 
possible to add the military as a fifth sphere/sector (see figure 2). In chapter 1, I mentioned that the 
military is also a product of society. Thus, it does not always work as a tool of the government in 
conflict and in that way it can also play an important role in the outcome of internal conflicts in a 
society.  
 
Figure 2. This thesis’ division of sectors in society 
 
An example of this is illustrated in Paul Danahar’s (2015:25) book “The New Middle East: 
The World after the Arab Spring”. He sums up the relation between a regime, the military and the 
people in the following matter: “If the army sees itself as an instrument of the state it will ditch the 
regime to protect the people. This is what we saw in Egypt and Tunisia. If the army has no 
investment in either the state or the regimes, then the military will crumble, which happened in 




people to protect it. Then the people must not only overthrow the regime, they must fight to 
overthrow the state because they are one and the same. That is what happened in Syria”. 
In his book “How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why”, Zoltan Barany explores and 
analyses how important the relations between the government and the army is for the success of 
revolutions (Barany 2016). Barany (ibid) goes deep into analysing which factors matter and why. 
Through his case studies, Barany (ibid:165) concludes that while there are many variables (knowns 
and unknowns), generally, the more we know about the relationships between the military/army6, 
the state, and society that form its environment, and the international setting in which it exists, the 
more self-assured we can be of the accuracy of our forecasts of internal conflicts. In terms of 
governance, we can see that the power-relationships in these cases revolve around the state and the 
people in which the military is in the middle and who it decides to support has an effect on the 
outcome of the revolutions presented. The power-relationships raise several questions, among other; 
can those in the military be held accountable and face negative consequences if they rebel against 
the state and loose? Likewise, what if they win but the people take over – will the people view the 
military as allies or as the next opponents to overrule? Overall, I mention this example to illustrate 
that the military, in a non-kinetic aspect, is still a part of society and the power-relationships that 
constitute that specific society. They are not just static tools. This is also relevant when the 
military’s loyalty to the government can be targeted as a vulnerability in HT.  
We have now briefly been introduced to the concepts (power-relationships and 
accountability) and how they can be understood. Overall, we can view governance through power-
relationships between the subjects involved in it and the accountability in the system. However, 
social relations are not just confined to power-relations and accountability, there are also other 










                                                 
6 Barany (ibid:6) uses the term military, armed forces, or simply army interchangeably. I use the term military 
consistently as I do not wish to exclude the other branches (air force, navy, and national home guard) which make up a 




2.4 Social capital 
This chapter’s introduction mentioned that governance and social capital are interconnected 
and overlap. In a generalised, theoretical distinction between the two concepts, one could say that 
governance can give us an insight to the power-relational roles and influence of entities in social 
relations, while social capital takes us deeper into how these social relations may foster, develop 
and exercise within and between different social entities. Together they provide us a deeper 
understanding of the processes in social dynamics in societies. 
The term social capital (SC) is broad and through decades of literature, it has gained many 
different definitions and uses. Nevertheless, one could say that the commonalities of most 
definitions on SC are with the focus on social relations that have productive benefits (Claridge 
2004). Portes (1998:8) for example, defines social capital as “the ability to secure benefits through 
membership in networks and other social structures”. Although the term itself became more 
apparent in social sciences through among researchers like Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988), it 
was with Putnam’s research in the 1990s and 2000, that the term became influential in community 
development practitioners in the US and internationally (DeFilippis 2001:783-784). Putnam 
(1993:167) defines social capital as “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”.  
In “Making Democracy Work” (1993), Putnam et al. compared twenty regional Italian 
governments (in northern and southern Italy) since the 1970s, which shared similar institutions but 
had different social, cultural and economic backgrounds. In the aim to gain understanding of the 
performance of democratic institutions, they concluded that mutual levels of trust in connection 
with norms, civic engagement7, and more horizontal level of ties are the key to making democracy 
work (ibid:3, 171-176, 185, DeFilippis 2001:785). Putnam’s definition is interesting because it 
brings in the concepts of trust, norms and network together to describe social organisation. In a 
sense, we can understand SC as organisation through different types of networks, norms in which 
the networks work by/within, and trust of varying degrees with which the networks work upon (in 
different aspects). However, Putnam’s definition and understanding of SC has also received a lot of 
criticism (Gelderblom 2018:1311). This chapter will discuss some of the criticism of Putnam’s 
research to illustrate a more balanced view as well as the complexity of SC as a concept, but first an 
explanation will be provided on how the concept of SC will be presented and conceptualised in this 
section. 
                                                 




In Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), social capital is researched in the context of business 
management and organisational advantage. In their research, they structure social capital through 
three dimensions (ibid:251-256)8:  
1. The structural dimension = how network ties and configuration may facilitate 
opportunities for access to resources and transfer of information. 
2. The cognitive dimension = how shared norms, values and behaviour through shared 
language, codes, and narratives, may form social collectives. 
3. The relational dimension = how trust and the extent of trust play a role in social 
relationships and the two previous dimensions.  
In these three dimensions, we can see that it is possible to relate them to the three concepts 
in Putnam’s definition – networks, norms and trust. In this chapter, the different ways to understand 
networks will be explained first. Then the issues of norms (together with identity), and lastly how 
trust may work in SC. Of course, this is not the only way to conceptualise or structure SC theory. 
Nevertheless, this is how this chapter has been structured to give an overview of how SC can be 
understood and studied through different aspects and levels of analysis.  
 
2.3.1 Networks in SC theory – the structural dimension 
When we talk about networks in this context, we talk about social networks as relationships 
among social entities. Likewise social network analysis focuses on the patterns and implications of 
these relationships (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1994:xii). Because SC is such a broad and 
complex term and social networks can encompass so many things, we can try to get an 
understanding of networks by looking at the different levels of ties (connectedness), as well as at 
the different levels of analysis in which networks can be studied. Beginning with the levels of 
connectedness in network, SC can be divided into three types (Gilchrist and Taylor 2016:53): 
1. Bonding social capital = describes strong relations, e.g. family and close friends. 
2. Bridging social capital = describes weaker relations between people who are different in 
their social identity and/or location but are connected through other forms of 
communities of interest, e.g. acquaintances and members of a voluntary organisation 
(e.g. a sports club or organisations advocating for certain public or political interests).  
3. Linking social capital = describes connections between people across status and power, 
e.g. service users and service providers or community members and government 
officials. 
                                                 
8 The explanations of the three dimensions by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998:251-256) are my own understanding and 




While bonding SC is useful for “getting by”, bridging and linking SC are needed for 
“getting on” or “getting ahead” (ibid). Moreover, while bonding (socialising within groups) and 
bridging (socialising between groups) represent horizontal networks in general, linking SC is a 
socialisation that occurs across clear, formal/institutionalised authority in society. This makes 
linking SC described as vertical because it refers to a more clear social relationship across social 
positions of power (vertical in a hierarchy) compared to the other two SC which are more horizontal 
(Putnam 1993:173).  
However, this does not exclude asymmetrical power-relations in the other two SC networks. 
Bonding and bridging SC, may also include vertical aspects, e.g. mother-daughter relations and 
team-captains in sport clubs, but these are not formalised and/or institutionalised relations like 
government-public relations. In addition to the levels of connectedness in networks, there are levels 
of analysis in which networks can be studied depending on if we want to analyse networks on an 
individual, regional or international level. Roughly, these can be divided into three levels of 
analysis: 
1. Micro level = e.g. individuals (person to person) 
2. Meso level = e.g. groups or organisations 
3. Macro level = e.g. communities or nations, international community etc. 
Some studies also look at the relations between the different levels. Gelderblom (2018) for 
example, looks at the influence of macro actors on micro and meso situations.  In his article, 
Gelderblom (ibid:1321-22) criticises Putnam’s research for neglecting vertical networks, 
overemphasising bridging SC as a primary solution to reduce communal tensions, and for 
underemphasising the negative aspects of SC. The two latter criticisms will be briefly explained 
later, but in regards to the first criticism, Putnam (1993:174) states that “no matter how important to 
its participants, cannot sustain trust and cooperation”, and that “vertical flows of information are 
often less reliable than horizontal flows”. However, as Gelderblom (2018:1312-1315) points out, in 
reality it is much more complex. Krishna and Shrader (1999:4) also point this out, writing that 
whether organisations are vertical or horizontal can be unclear, and what type of organisation and 
their composition also matter. Lastly, empirical investigations also indicate that horizontally shaped 
networks do not necessarily have higher SC (ibid). 
In summary, there are two ways of categorising networks, into levels of connectedness and 








2.3.2 Norms and identity – the cognitive dimension 
In the cognitive dimension we find the shared norms, values and behaviour through shared 
language, codes, and narratives (as mentioned earlier). The shared language, codes, and narratives 
from Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998:253-254) can be understood as certain linguistically as well as 
socially constructed ways of behaviour a certain social group share and that this facilitates for easier 
exchange of information in networks. In Putnam (1993:171-172) the term norms is used to explain 
socially constructed behaviour. “Norms are inculcated and sustained by modelling and socialisation 
(including civic education) and by sanctions (ibid:171).  
Norms not only dictate what proper and improper behaviour is, but also through setting such 
social “rules”, they form a prediction of how people within the same social group will behave. In 
Putnam (ibid:172), norms of reciprocity is about the idea that if I do something for you now, I can 
expect you to do something for me later. The idea here is that this fosters trust. 
Further, I would argue that the norms discussed in Putnam (1993) and the shared language 
and codes discussed in Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) can be seen as a part of the bigger concept 
“identity formation”. By this, I mean the social group’s collective identity9. As noted in Hopkins’ 
(2011:528) research on religion and SC in the context of Muslim identity in Britain, “how social 
networks are used and how relationships are developed depends on group members’ 
understandings of their collective identity”. Collective identities (as simultaneously self-perceived 
and as perceived by others) matter for networks and trust relationships (ibid:532-534, 538). The 
idea behind this is that how we behave and foster networks depends not only on norms developing 
and sustained within a social group but also on how a social group relates to externalities such as 
other social groups. I would argue that identity (who identities who as what) plays a role because 
the formation of identity creates social structures of in- and out-groups to varying degrees and this, 
in turn, influences norms and trust in others. Further, it is important to note that identity and norms 
are not stable phenomenons, they are interchangeable and constantly develop over time with 
internal and external influence (Hopkins 2011:530, 531-534, 538, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 
1994:3-25). This duality of internal and external formation of collective identity affects network.  
The connection between networks and formation of identity (ID) has also been noted in 
research connected to coping strategies for local communities in a globalised environment 
(Bærenholdt and Aarsæther 2001:41-42, Aarsæther and Bærenholdt 2001:22-26, 36-40). In that 
context, formation of identity involves the individual’s dependency on more than one community. 
The formation of identity is not given but constructed and negotiated – through laws, politics, 
networks, and cultural traditions (Aarsæther and Bærenholdt 2001:36-38). 
                                                 
9 This does not mean that individual identity is not important (and it is mentioned as a part of micro level in network 




While criticism of Putnam’s research is more focused on networks and trust aspects, there is 
also the issue that norms as a “rule-based” concept may allow for different interpretations of how 
and from whom norms are enforced. Gelderblom (2018:1317) notes that in many cases, norms are 
imposed from top down (i.e. macro actors develop/enforce norms). This is not fully taken into the 
discussion in Putnam (1993). 
Overall, the “rule-based” concept of norms (from Putnam) can be replaced by identity 
formation. Identity formation not only contains shared norms, values, language etc. but also through 
the self-perceived and “perceived by others” aspect of collective identity of social groups we can 
look at how identity formation in different levels of analysis (individual ID, ID in minority 
communities, to national ID) may influence the levels of connectedness (bonding, bridging, linking) 
in networks.  
 
2.3.3 Trust – the relational dimension 
Trust is often seen as a major part of SC. However, it is a difficult concept to define. One 
can talk about trust as a complete confidence in someone else or as a “quid pro quo” in which I do 
this for you and then I can expect you to do something for me later (referring to the norms of 
reciprocity mentioned earlier). One can also analyse trust on an individual (micro) level that 
depends on personal experiences and state of mind, versus a collective trust (meso/macro level) that 
relates to how a social group views trust through their collective identity. The latter is more relevant 
to this thesis.  
In Svendsen and Svendsen (2016:17), they talk about vulnerability as an inevitable price of 
trust because one can never be 100% sure in another person. In that sense, trust becomes “a 
willingness to be vulnerable to another person based on the expectation, but not certainty, that he 
or she will act benevolently” (ibid). They also separate specific trust between concrete persons one 
know (family, friends), and social/generalised trust that is more about trust between people in 
general. The latter is mostly relevant for this thesis. Here, they tie it to Fukuyama’s definition in 
which “trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create 
regular expectations of regular and honest behaviour” (ibid). In this sense, trust becomes about 
predictions and expectance of reciprocity (to add: through the formation of a collective identity). In 
this way, trust in SC can overlap with accountability (and certainly predictability in the 
authoritarian regime situation) in governance. On the other hand, whether one can describe 
accountability (and predictability) in power-relationships between e.g. the government and the 
people as a part reciprocity and confidence, is a discussion in itself and may depend in each case. 
In the relational dimension in Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s article (1998:254-256) norms and 




categorise them into the cognitive dimension instead of the relational dimension in this chapter to 
show the similarities and relatedness between Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s conceptualisation and 
Putnam’s. In practice, these all overlap. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (ibid) use the definition of trust as 
the “results of somebody’s intended action will be appropriate from our point of view” (ibid:254). I 
would argue that this definition also relates to the formation of collective identity in which a social 
group both sets the norms/rules of conduct, while having to adhere to external norms as well (e.g. a 
minority having its cultural norms, but also being influenced by the national norms or the nation 
state they reside within). So what is the relation between trust and norms (here: identity formation), 
trust and networks?  
Putnam (1993:167-171) talks about a type of informal savings institutions called “rotating 
credit association”10 to illustrate his point on the role of trust as a lubricator in cooperation and 
networking. He also contrasts it with the implications of distrust/absence of trust in that without 
trust there can be no mutual confidence to build network on. Krishna and Shrader (1999:6) note that 
it is difficult to verify group solidarity with reference to norms (in this thesis: identity formation) 
alone. Likewise, network forms also don’t provide any reliable indicators of human interaction 
occurring within a group. Network types can both promote and support cooperation as well as 
competition and conflict (ibid). In that regard, this thesis argues it makes sense to look at identity 
formation and networks together with the concept of trust. The relative levels of trust add an 
additional indicator for how a network may function. In some networks, trust may be the glue that 
holds it together – e.g. in Putnam’s examples of rotating credit association. In contrast, a study on 
groups and associations in Russia concluded that trust is not associated with all types of networks – 
even those that are horizontally organised or have a heterogeneous group of members (ibid:7).  
Gelderblom (2018:1314) criticises Putnam’s research (after 2000s) for his/their 
overemphasis on “the casual role of bridging SC as a solution to religious intolerance that they 
underplay the extent to which bridging SC is itself the effect of deeper social changes”. This 
criticism is important, because an issue with Putnam’s research is the limited discussion on the 
negative aspects of social capital. As Gilchrist and Taylor (2016:52-53) mention, networks can be 
exclusive, secretive and unaccountable. Likewise, social norms (in a collective identity) can be 
oppressive for some, while trust can be hugely complicated – depending on individual connections 
and social contexts. In some social contexts, close ties may foster discrimination and conservatism, 
causing social stagnation and resistance to change (ibid:53). For example, if social capital is high 
within a small group of people in a society, it could be at the expense of the others in the society 
who are not part of this small group. Now imagine if this small group consisted of business or 
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political elites whom control greater economic resources/capital in the society. What could be the 
implications for the remaining people in the society? DeFilippis (2001:792) presents this argument 
by challenging Coleman’s (1988) often cited example of the diamond industry in New York, which 
is concentrated around a specific Jewish community. DeFilippis (ibid) argues that when any group 
of people control an economic market or activity it can become difficult for outsiders to enter it. 
 
2.3.4 Networks, identity formation and trust – bringing it together 
Essentially, what we need to think of in relation to trust in SC, is that trust gives us an 
indicator of the levels of connectedness in networks, as well as understanding the degree to how 
collective identities are formed. By knowing how much people trust their government or other 
people in their own collective groups as well as others, may tell us something about how collective 
identities and how networks can be sustained, deter, and develop. Looking back to the three levels 
of connectedness (bonding, bridging and linking), we can analyse them through their levels of trust 
and the role of identity in them. Therefore, this thesis argues we need the trinity of networks, 
identity formation and trust to understand the dynamics of SC. Looking at trust without networks 
and collective identities gives us very little context to base the research on. Likewise, looking at one 
of the other without the other two, we risk loosing additional relevant information and context.  
For example when we look back at Danahar’s (2015:25) quote, the military’s decision 
depends partially on the military’s identity - how it sees itself in relation to the state and the people. 
Trust in this aspect is not just an issue between these formal institutions but also about the identity 
of the individuals as well as the collective groups within these formal institutions and how the trust 
within and between the groups affect the networks and formation of identity. From there we can 
ask, how is the military connected through networks? What levels of connectedness (primarily 
bridging and linking) are working most – do the generals have a good connection with government 
officials, their lower-ranking officers, or with the people? Do the lower-ranked officers have a good 
connection with government officials, their own higher-ranking officers, or with the people? 
Besides understanding the trinity of networks, identity formation and trust in SC, the point 
of this section is that we understand how complex and over-arching the term SC is. To fit SC into 
each research context (including how to measure it) we must fine-tune how we define it in each 
context and analyse how it functions in that specific context. In this chapter, I merely present the 
concept SC and its relation to the topic of this thesis. The further application and possible 
measurements of SC will not be discussed until the analytical discussion in chapter 5 after 
reviewing the findings in the case study of Ukraine. As such, I take a more inductive approach by 
first observing the case study of Ukraine through the context of governance and social capital, and 




Nevertheless, figure 3 is an illustration of this thesis’s definition of SC as “features of social 
relations based on networks, identity formation, and trust, which have an effect on the efficiency of 
coordinated actions through social relations in a society”. In this definition, SC can have positive 
and/or negative consequences, but overall it effects the way societies conduct coordinated actions to 
function as a society - whether getting official documents through government bureaucracy, based 
on linking SC, or procuring products through informal networks based on bonding and/or bridging 
SC (e.g. through friends or black markets). In the illustration, we can see that the three concepts 
(network, identity formation and trust) are interconnected and that influence can go from micro to 
macro level and vice versa. If networks are weak, identity formation within a society is fragmented 
and is a source of tension, and/or if trust between people is low, then the efficiency of coordinating 
actions can be low.  
In the next chapter, we will look into the MCDC-report’s analytical framework on HT, how 
it looks at the societal aspects in HT, and how this can be connected to governance and SC. 
 
 










CHAPTER THREE – HYBRID THREATS AND THE MCDC-REPORT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 and 2 discussed hybrid threats (HT) and briefly explained what the MCDC-report 
is. In this chapter, we go deeper into the MCDC-report and discuss its description of HT, its 
analytical framework, as well as its limitations, which tie it to this thesis’s subject on governance 
and social capital. We begin by looking at the description of hybrid warfare (HW)/hybrid threats 
(HT) in the MCDC-report, before examining how the report conceptualises HT in its analytical 
framework. 
 
3.2 The MCDC-report’s description of hybrid threats 
Chapter 2 explained the reason for this thesis’s use of the concept HT rather than HW, 
despite the MCDC-report’s usage of the latter concept. In the MCDC-report, HW is described as 
“the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the 
full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic effects” (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 
2017:8). Furthermore, they write that the MCDC-assessment concluded that HW is “asymmetric 
and uses multiple instruments of power along a horizontal and vertical axis, and to varying degrees 
shares an increased emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war”. Just to 
clarify, the latter description is an extension of the former and, as such, these two sentences act as 
one description of HW. Through this description, the MCDC-report’s analytical framework aims at 
understanding HW through three main characteristics/features: 
1. Instruments of power and synergistic effects 
2. Critical functions and vulnerabilities in society are targeted 
3. Effects and non-linearity 
When we look at the MCDC-report’s description of HW with these three characteristics, we 
can see that they are quite similar to the Hybrid CoE’s description and characteristics of HT. The 
MCDC-report’s description offers a functional definition of HT, which forms the basis of their 
analytical framework. The MCDC-report states (ibid, see footnote) “Because of the difficulties of 
agreeing on a common definition of the term hybrid warfare, this project focused on describing, 
rather than defining11, the challenge”. The main goal is to understand the dynamics of HT and its 
relation to governance and social capital. This further illustrates the reason for why, in this thesis, 
the distinction between HT and HW is not so important. They both highlight: 1) societal 
                                                 




vulnerabilities, and 2) coordinated and synchronised actions using various elements/instruments12 of 
power. In addition, the MCDC-report mentions the characteristic of effects and non-linearity (which 
is here argued to also be the case in HT). This chapter will explain the MCDC-report’s three 
characteristics but will first briefly discuss the functionality of the MCDC-report’s description of 
HW, which throughout the rest of this thesis will be referred to as HT.  
The MCDC-report’s description of HT is useful in several ways. The argument presented 
here is that there are four key points made in the MCDC-report’s definition. Firstly, the description 
does not distinguish between state and non-state actors - thereby focusing more on the 
functional/operational and strategic13 perspective of HT. Thus, it does not focus on who the actor is 
but more on the act itself. This can be useful if we want to be flexible and not exclude different 
types of actors. Secondly, it does not separate attack or defence, which can be useful because we 
reduce the risk of being enemy-centred as both the attacking and defending actor in the conflict can 
use HT tactics (also simultaneously). Thirdly, the description highlights the relation between 
vulnerabilities, instruments of power/means, and effects, which are clear characteristics in HT. This 
is also the case in the description from Hybrid CoE. Lastly, their wording “emphasis on creativity, 
ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war” does not directly imply soley the use of warfare but 
rather the wide use of elements of war. The interpretation in this thesis is that their wording allows 











                                                 
12 Elements and instruments in this thesis have the same meaning in this thesis and both are used interchangeably in 
much of the literature on HT used in this thesis. 
13 Operation, tactic, and strategy are concepts necessary to distinguish from each other. According to the Merriam-
Webster dictionary, an operation (in a military sense) is “an action, mission, or manoeuvre including its planning and 
execution” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/operation). Tactic is “a method of employing forces in 
combat” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tactic). Strategy is “the science and art of employing the 
political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to 
adopted policies in peace or war” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy). While operation and tactic 
may be similar in definition for a method or act, strategy is a term that denotes a more long-term and higher-level of 




3.3 The MCDC-report’s three characteristics in relation to its analytical framework 
As mentioned, the MCDC-report’s description and analytical framework understands HT 
through three characteristics. The three characteristics from the MCDC-report will be further used 
in the case study and analysis. The next sections of this chapter will explain the three characteristics 
through their meaning in the MCDC-report’s analytical framework and the functionality of HT.  
 
3.3.1 Instruments of power and synergistic effects 
On the instruments of power, we refer to military and non-military, conventional and non-
conventional elements. These elements or instruments of power can include a wide range of tools 
from propaganda/disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, funding NGOs, facilitating protests, to 
political and economic leverage. In the MCDC-report the instruments of power are divided into 
military, political, economic, civil, and information (abbreviated to MPECI instruments). In 
addition, military elements can range from direct kinetic action by using conventional or Special 
Forces in specific operations, to indirect and sometimes non-kinetic actions like giving training and 
logistical support of rebels in a proxy war. This aspect allows for an expansion of the non-attrition-
approaches. Attrition-approach is based on symmetric strengths between opponents and it is 
something that can separate kinetic actions in HT from more conventional kinetic actions in 
warfare. Asymmetric wars are often associated with guerrilla warfare or insurgency, in which 
strategically directed sabotage and smaller scale attacks were often utilised by forces because they 
knew they couldn’t match the qualitative or quantitative strength of their opponent to follow an 
attrition-approach (Arreguin-Toft 2001) (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). As such, directed operations 
to achieve certain effects were more sought out rather than big battles to take out the opponent in 
one go (ibid). Such opportunities are increased when there is no military elements but instead the 
attacker uses a range of diffused non-military elements to conduct HT. This can put pressure on the 
opponent, leading to wanted effects for the attacker without leading to war. In addition, as Popescu 
(2015:2) writes, “one reason why [hybrid threats] is so dangerous and potentially destabilising is 
that it is easy and cheap to launch for external aggressors, but costly in various ways for the 
defenders. While an attacker can try and hide behind plausible deniability, those responding are 
immediately placed in the spotlight”.  
The issue of achieving specific effects brings us to the concept of effects in HT, and more 
specifically “synergistic effects”. The dictionary14 definition of synergy is “the interaction of 
elements that when combined produce a total effect that is greater than the sum of the individual 
elements, contributions, etc”. In relation to objectives (aimed effects), the concept “synergistic 
                                                 




effects” makes sense as a description of how actors in asymmetric warfare often operate. An 
example is the Vietnam War in which the North Vietnam fought South Vietnam and the USA using 
both regular/conventional forces but also irregular/guerrilla fighters to compensate for being weaker 
technologically and in firepower (Lowe in Murray and Mansoor, 2012:255-281). Another example 
is the case of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War, where they utilised a mixture of guerrilla 
tactics and technology in dense urban centres to take on the conventionally superior opponent – the 
Israel Defence Forces (IDF) (Hoffman 2009a:37). We can see (and as mentioned in previous 
chapters) that the mixture/hybridity of instruments in HT is not a new phenomenon. As Murray and 
Mansoor (2012:3-12) illustrate in their book “Hybrid warfare: fighting complex opponents from the 
ancient world to the present”, from the Peloponnesian war in 5th century BC to the Vietnam War in 
the 1960s and 1970s, mixing military and non-military, conventional and non-conventional 
elements in warfare is nothing new. 
However, what can be argued as new is the context of today’s increasingly 
interconnectedness between these spectres through technological (e.g. internet communications 
technology - ICT) and political developments (e.g. the role of transnational corporations, EU, 
NGOs, and increased globalisation, etc., Nye and Welch 2014:298-325, Wigell 2019:260). In 
today’s global economy, very few countries are economically isolated (Jackson and Sørensen 
2016:7). They trade with other countries and their foreign policies, as well as national policies, are 
often influenced by this. An example is the economic interdependency established through the EU 
in many European countries (Hovi and Underdal 2010:88-92). This economic interdependency can 
be good, but it can also make countries vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy and to 
sudden trade policies in countries that they trade with, which further could cause tensions nationally 
(ibid:232-235). This can allow for economics to play a greater role as a leverage in HT. In one way, 
since the world is more economically and politically (through international organisations, like EU, 
UN, etc.) connected, what happens in one place in the world is increasingly more quickly conveyed 
across the globe and can potentially have an increasing effect somewhere else in the world (Nye and 
Welch 2014:273-287, Wigell 2019:260). 
Regarding technology, recent ICT had allowed for information and communication to 
spread fast across the globe. This is positive in many aspects, but can also reveal a challenge in 
controlling and handling digital security in important parts of a countries infrastructure – e.g. in the 
health sector. An example is a case from Norway in which the health administration in the southeast 
region (Helse Sør-Øst) outsourced its IT-services and data servers to outside of Norway. It was later 
discovered that over 100 foreigners (among other people from China, India, Malaysia, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, Germany, and France) had access to the health journals of 2.8 million people in this part 




people (with access to sensitive information) can be targeted by foreign actors and pressured based 
on their medical issues to hand over sensitive information. 
Another challenge, is the natural anarchy that internet has in the sense that the internet 
generally has no supervisor – anyone can establish websites and post what they want. Before, 
propaganda could be limited to radio, TV, newspapers. Today, we find it not only on the 
newspaper’s website, but also in social media. While this increased information spread can allow 
for more diversity of information to citizens, a challenge is that the algorithms for which news and 
information is sent to each individual centres on what the algorithms understand that individual is 
interested in (Flaxman et al. 2016:317-318). This can lead to an echo-chamber effect that reinforces 
someone’s opinion and may lead to more ideological segregation to in society (ibid). Another issue 
with technology is that many advanced technologies once only available to states and research 
institutions have become more easily available to the individual (e.g. drones, smartphones, 3D-
printers, various computer software etc.). This can allow for increased innovation, but it can also 
give opponents wanting to conduct HT more tools much easier. In the Hybrid CoE report on 
addressing HT, Treverton et al. (2018:5) writes “the virtual realm has dramatically lowered the cost 
of propaganda, and cyber operations are also relatively cheap”. 
These examples can have positive effects but also pose potentially serious threats. Together, 
all these potential threats can be done covert and without it being possible for the attacked to know 
who or where the attack came from – even when several instruments of power are used together. An 
example can be a computer virus shutting down vital functions in a society (e.g. hospitals and 
electricity grids) and sabotage on industries, together with local protests being instigated by foreign 
entities. At the same time, other countries can be covertly pressured to cut off e.g. oil supply to the 
intended victim country. These are four instruments of power used together. An additional feature 
in the MCDC-report’s analytical framework is that it analyses the escalation of instruments of 
power through vertical (in terms of the intensity of usage) and/or horizontal (the synchronisation 
with other instruments) aspects. Figure 4 is a useful illustration, as we can see how the MPECI 
instruments of power may interact and can be used to achieve desired strategic objectives, i.e. 
effects. The degrees of intensity and synchronisation of the instruments of power will vary 





Figure 4. Vertical and horizontal escalation (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017:9) 
 
3.3.2 Vulnerabilities and critical functions 
The vulnerabilities in the MCDC-report’s description is directly linked to their framework in 
which MPECI elements work as the instruments used against vulnerabilities in critical function. In 
the MCDC-report, critical functions are defined as “activities or operations distributed across the 
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum which, if 
discontinued, could lead to a disruption of services that a working system (for example, a state, its 
society or a subsection thereof) depends on” (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017:11). 
Furthermore, they explain (ibid), that these functions have vulnerabilities that may give an opponent 
the possibilities to exploit depending on the means it has at its disposal and what its intent is. As 
such, which vulnerabilities are targeted may not always be apparent and some less vulnerable 
functions may be targeted instead of other more vulnerable functions depending on the means and 
intentions of the opponent. In that regard, critical functions involves a magnitude of actors across 
different levels (micro, meso, or macro level) in society. Critical functions can be specific persons 
with key functions or organisations and departments in public or private sector. It can also be 
physical objects like infrastructure (e.g. roads, power grids etc.), or processes like the technical, 
political and/or jurisdictional procedures in public and/or private sector (ibid). In figure 5, we can 
see how the MCDC-report’s analytical framework (se figure 5), visualises the spectrum of critical 






Figure 5. Visualisation of HT (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017:14) 
 
This is just one way to divide society into, and variations can be made depending on how 
one wants to assess vulnerabilities and critical functions in society. Because the instruments of 
power are across military, political, economic, civil, and information, one could say that the they 
(MPECI) overlap with the PMESII. In figure 6 is a table with examples to illustrate the relational 
role between MPECI as instruments of power and the vulnerabilities in society (presented as 
PMESII in the MCDC-report). 
Figure 6. Made by the author based on some of the examples in the MCDC-report (Cullen 
and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017:27-30) 
MPECI Example as an instrument of power Example as a vulnerability in society 
Military Conventional or covert military forces 
deployed. 
If the military is weak and disorganised, it could 
be vulnerability as it might be less able to deter a 
threat 
Political Funding of opposition parties or political 
campaigns to smear the government  
Weak political leadership 
Economic Using economic sanctions as leverage High economic dependency on one or few 
industry sectors or imported resources 
Civil/social Encouraging civilian rebellion against the 
government 
Ethnic divisions and tensions in civil society  




The reason for this illustration is to make it clear that both the MPECI as instruments of 
power and the PMESII as the spectrum of critical functions exemplify how HT is a very societal 
and civilian focused threat. This is what makes the MCDC-report’s analytical framework suitable 
for a more sociological analysis of HT. The limitation of the analytical framework is not that it 
doesn’t put societal vulnerabilities into focus, but that it lacks deeper analysis for how society 
(represented through their PMESII spectrum) functions and how certain features in society make 
the critical functions more susceptible to vulnerabilities, which can be targeted in HT.   
As the PMESII spectrum represents society and the interaction between different parts of 
society, understanding how these relations work in times of threats and in warfare seem important 
in the process of assessing vulnerabilities. HT is conducted on different spectrums, meaning that not 
only the vulnerability of each spectrum needs to be assessed, but also the vulnerability in the 
relations between the spectrums need to be assessed. Assessing what critical functions we have and 
the degree of vulnerability, requires a great deal of self-awareness and understanding of what 
governs stability and change in our own societies. This awareness brings us to this thesis’s aim on 
understanding how the concepts of governance and social capital can contribute to the MCDC-
report’s analytical framework to further expose a society’s vulnerabilities and subsequent 
susceptibility towards HT. 
In this thesis’s theoretical framework, we discussed how governance centre’s on the 
concepts power-relationships and accountability between the spectrums, while social capital (SC) 
involves networks, identity formation, and trust in society. Together, these concepts may tell us 
something about the possible vulnerabilities in a society and what that may mean to the society’s 
susceptibility towards HT. An example being the role of militaries in revolutions (as explained in 
chapter 2). With this in mind, we can come to understand that vulnerabilities in the concepts of 
governance and social capital are related to the vulnerabilities described in the MCDC-report. 
Moreover, such vulnerabilities can be exploited by the opponent in HT scenarios (as the MCDC-
report describes) and therefore may have an influence on the effectiveness of HT. Here, the 
effectiveness can be influenced by vulnerabilities in two stages. 
The first, is the starting ground – the situation of the targeted society before HT is conducted 
by the opponent. If there are already existing deep vulnerabilities, then that society is already an 
easier target for HT compared to if the society has few vulnerabilities to begin with. In the next 
chapter, we will look into the governance and SC situation in Ukraine before looking at the case of 
Russia’s intervention in Crimea and Ukraine. 
The second stage of vulnerabilities, is how the existing vulnerabilities may increase the 
already existing vulnerabilities and/or lead to more vulnerabilities (that did not exist before). In 




targeted society. Noteworthy is that effects can be unforeseen by both the subject and the opponent, 
and therefore the opponent is forced to shift its tactics on spot according to the development15.  
 
3.3.3 The effects and non-linearity 
This brings us to the final concept in the MCDC-report’s analytical framework: “Non-linear 
effects”. Section 3.3.1 explained synergistic effects as the coordination of instruments of power 
(MPECI) in order to create desired effects. The concept of non-linearity is centred on the idea that 
the synchronised actions need to be revised continually as the situation changes due to the effects 
resulting from the previous set of synchronised actions. As is says in the MCDC-report: “The ability 
of a hybrid warfare actor to synchronize means against specific vulnerabilities to create effects 
means that one cannot readily discern a linear causal chain of events. The more elements that are 
in the mix the more difficult causality becomes” (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2017:13). 
In other words, the correlation between action A and outcome B is not certain – anything 
can happen and this needs to be accounted for. The process of operations are non-linear as the 
effects are non-linear. This makes the whole process of analysing effects in operations and 
strategies more challenging. More variables need to be accounted for and most likely the non-linear 
effects cannot be seen until they have been manifested, i.e. our ability to predict is reduced. This 
requires the adversary to be highly adaptable to new situations and effects that may arrive as the HT 
operations progresses.  
This challenges the ability to counter HT and it is unlikely that full-predictability in HT can 
ever be achieved. However, this thesis argues that part of increasing predictability lies in 
understanding the governance and social capital situation in a given society. The spectrum of 
critical functions in society (PMESII), represents society as a whole and the interaction between 
different parts of society. Thereby understanding how these relations (through the concepts in 
governance and social capital) work in times before and during HT seem important in the process of 







                                                 
15 One can, of course, argue that this is the case in all threats and warfare. However, this may be more apparent and 




CHAPTER FOUR – CRIMEA AND UKRAINE: A CASE STUDY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters presented the theoretical and analytical frameworks on this thesis’s 
three main concepts, governance, social capital (SC), and hybrid threats (HT). In this chapter, we 
look at the Russian intervention in Crimea and Ukraine. The aim of this chapter is to look at the 
case study through governance and SC. Based on this, the next chapter (chapter five) will analyse 
the relevancy of the three concepts together, to address this thesis’s research question. This chapter 
will begin with a brief overview of the governance and social capital (SC) situation in Ukraine since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Then a brief overview of the events in the Russian intervention 
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine will be presented. 
 
4.2 Governance and social capital in Ukraine 
Before looking into the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, it is useful to understand the 
situation in Ukraine before and in relation to the conflict. In this section, we will explore how the 
social situation of Ukraine through governance and SC.  
 
4.2.1 Governance 
Though it has been mentioned earlier that governance and SC are interconnected, they will 
be addressed separately in this section, to make clear the impact of both concepts in the context of 
Ukraine. To reiterate, governance is about how societies are structured. It encompasses how power 
and decision-making is exercised through how rules, structures, processes and relations between 
entities within a society interact. In this thesis, governance is viewed through power-relationships 
between the entities involved in it (here: Ukrainian society) and the accountability in the context of 
democracy. 
Ukraine gained its independence along with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 
(Hrytsak 1998:271). An important note in this independence is that that the constituting regions of 
west and east Ukraine, each with their own particular history, had never before been formed into an 
entity as an independent state (Janmaat 2000:11, 13). Their different historical backgrounds, shaped 
the national consciousness and political outlook of the Ukrainians as the titular nationality (i.e. 
Ukraine) (ibid:13). In figure 7 is a map showing the regions in Ukraine. 
Without going too deep into the history of Ukraine, the distinctiveness of each region is 
related to their historical connections to the old empires in Europe. Roughly summarised eastern 
(and then southern) Ukraine has had the longest and closest connection to the Russian Empire (from 




Ukraine was part of Poland until it became part of the Russian Empire in a piecemeal fashion from 
the 15th century until 1795 when the entire region went to the Russian Empire. Finally, western 
Ukraine was part of Poland until the end of the 18th century, then part of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire until 1918 and then again part of Poland until the Soviet invasion of 1939 (Janmaat 
2000:14-17, Darden 2014). Even though central Ukraine shares a more similar history with east and 
south than west Ukraine, central Ukraine was more oriented towards Ukrainian nationalism while 
east and south’s formation of political culture first took place in the Russian Empire and later in the 
Soviet Union (Himka 2015:131-133). The different political and cultural historical developments 
resulted in what Janmaat (2000:17-18) describes as two dimensions of divergences in Ukraine’s 
regions. In one dimension, rural, predominantly Ukrainian speaking regions versus urban, 
predominantly Russian-speaking regions. In the other dimension, weak Ukrainian national 
conscious regions versus strong Ukrainian national conscious regions (see figure 8). 
 
Figure 7. The territorial administrative structure of Ukraine (from Janmaat 2000:14) 
 
 




In his article on nation-building in post-Soviet Ukraine, Janmaat (2000:19-22) illustrates 
how these regional differences were evident in the 1991, 1994 and 1998 presidential elections. The 
general divide in the political landscape is that western Ukrainians consistently vote for nationalist 
candidates (who oppose closer ties to Russia), while eastern and southern Ukrainians vote for leftist 
and centre-left candidates who favour strong Russian ties. This political divide is apparent through 
Ukraine’s history, especially after its independence in 1991 (Himka 2015:130-136). The western 
region was a hotbed for anti-Russian and pro-European sentiment during the Soviet times (Darden 
2014). When the Soviet Union took over in western Ukraine, it met a very hostile population and 
had to deal with a large-scale insurgency. The western region were among the first to protest against 
Soviet rule again in the 1980s, and in 1991 they voted by large majorities for secession from the 
Soviet Union (being the only Ukrainian region to do so) (ibid). Since its independence, Ukrainian 
central authorities have been combating regional diversity through a nation-building process16 
(Janmaat 2000:24). Through this process of “Ukrainisation”, certain elements of Russian culture 
and language have been marginalised (Polese 2018). This will be discussed later in regards to social 
capital. Already in 1993, the dissatisfaction with Kiev’s “anti-Russian” foreign policy and fear of 
Ukrainisation prompted the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast Councils to vote for regional autonomy 
during the mass miners’ strike in June that year (Janmaat 2000:22).  
In addition to this regional divide, the governance of Ukraine’s politics is highly centralised 
and bears witness of a political system in which the winner takes it all where one regional faction 
sits in Kiev with either Russian or European backing (Darden 2014). When Yanukovych and his 
government were ousted in February 2014, the West viewed it as a semi-constitutional revolution. 
In contrast, the Russians viewed it as a right-wing coup d’état (Darden 2014). While both versions 
is partly true, as Darden (ibid) explains, each misses the point. The relevant issue is that in 
Ukrainian politics the power shifted from one region to another in an extreme fashion. The 
Euromaidan17 was only sympathised with by 20% in the eastern region and 8% in the southern 
region. The new government take over was therefore not viewed so favourably (ibid). The historical 
and recent political events overall make the power-relationship in Ukrainian politics very polarised 
and unstable. Darden (ibid) argues that the east and south’s view of the government and the national 
political elections as unfair requires a process of decentralisation in order to gradually build up trust 
and legitimacy – and eventually stability. Kiev would need to transfer its power to the other regions 
to avoid the situation of a centralised power, which divides the country rather than unifying it. 
                                                 
16 Nation-building here refers to state policy intended to nationally homogenize the population (from Janmaat 2000:22). 
17 The Euromaidan is the name of the protest against the Yanukovych government due to the sudden refusal to sign the 
free trade and Association Agreements with the European Union (EU). The protest began on the 21st November 2013 




One of the major challenges with this (and many say the main challenge with Ukraine 
overall) is corruption18 (De Waal 2016:7, Leitner and Meissner 2018:183-184). The national politics 
in Ukraine follows a governance framework of a semi-presidential representative democratic 
republic in which the presidents rules with a prime minister and a cabinet that has the responsibility 
of the legislature of the state. However, as with many post-Soviet states, the transition from Soviet 
rule to democracy has faced many challenges. Kuzio (2005:33-41) describes Ukraine’s governance 
situation during the years of president Kuchma (1994-2004) as semi-authoritarian. By this, Kuzio 
(ibid) states that in an effort to make the transition from communism to capitalism, Ukraine during 
this time got stuck somewhere in between. Thus, while not resembling a totalitarian regime, this 
system (under Kuchma) was characterised through; intimidation, loyal parties competing for 
favours, poorly functioning legislatives with little power, a semi-free media with self-censorship, 
and a state involvement in, and over-regulation of, the economy (ibid:34-35). This makes the 
power-relationship in the Ukrainian political system more concentrated into one entity in the 
government (the president and his close informal network) rather than having it distributed through 
the different entities in government and other public sectors (in accordance with the governance 
framework for representative democracy). In other words, the horizontal accountability (balance of 
power within the state) is not ideal according to the principles of governance in a representative 
democracy. 
The “partial retrenchment” in the political system meant a continuation of clientelism 
practices, which can also be seen as part of the Soviet and pre-Soviet legacy in Ukraine (Leitner and 
Meissner 2018:185). As noted in Leitner and Meissner (ibid), the Soviet Union was a breeding 
ground for clientelist politics. This is because the Soviet system conserved patterns of pre-modern 
forms of interaction, based on trust, personal interactions and exchange (i.e. trust and networks in 
social capital theory). Meanwhile, the centralist, top-down structure of institutions and procedures, 
together with the lack of checks and balances proved to be advantageous for patronage (ibid). As 
such, during the privatisation period after Soviet dissolved, the members of the nomenklatura 
privatised official positions and material goods in order to hand them over to their clientele in 
exchange for loyalty. Those profiting from this are today many of the wealthy oligarchs (ibid:186). 
This made it over to the political sphere as economic and political power merge – creating 
nomenklatura democratisation, as Kuzio (2005:41) explains, enabling electoral patronage.   
Ukraine at the time (and arguably now as well) is an archetypal delegative democracy in 
which citizens remain passive between elections (ibid:42). As a consequence, this democratic 
legitimacy is used to promote and justify authoritarian corporatist politics. The rule of law remains 
                                                 





weak, institutionalisation of democratic norms is paltry, the historical experience of democracy is 
weak, and the executive presents itself as standing above party politics (ibid:42-43). All this 
combined hampers the possibility for the civil society to find a space where it can function 
effectively and grow – the institutionalisation of democracy takes no place and turns to a vicious 
cycle where weak institutions are made weaker through policy because they are accused to be weak 
(ibid:43). It is among this De Waal (2016) talks about in his report on fighting a culture of 
corruption in Ukraine. Essentially corruption is strongly routed in Ukrainian politics (as well as 
society as a whole), and the Euromaidan’s ousting of government in 2014 had very little effect on 
the overall challenges with corruption (ibid:8). Ultimately, even though the people have the power 
to oust their president, there is not necessarily enough vertical accountability to have an effect on 
the overall challenge of corruption in Ukraine. 
Overall, Ukrainian’s highly centralised politics combined with its clientelist features of 
governance seems to give a poor distribution of power-relationship, which has a major impact on 
the functions, efficiency, and accountability of Ukrainian public sector, and its relation to the civil 
society in general. In the next section, we will look at some of the overlapping issues and impacts 
through social capital. 
 
4.2.2 Social capital 
Looking back at this thesis’s theoretical framework, social capital (SC) is about the features 
of social relations based on the concepts networks, identity formation, and trust. These three 
concepts have an effect on the efficiency of coordinated actions through social relations in a society. 
With this in mind, we will now look at some of the features in networks, identity formation, and 
trust in Ukrainian society. Due to their interconnectedness, these three concepts will be discussed 
interchangeably and not necessarily in an orderly fashion. 
Nevertheless, beginning with the first concept in social capital (SC) theory, the networks in 
Ukrainian society can be characterised as a relying on informal rather than formal networks. 
Referring back to the Soviet legacy of clientelism and corruption in post-Soviet Ukraine, informal 
networks are used on all levels – macro, meso and micro (here: national, regional and individual) - 
in Ukrainian society. On the macro level, the political elites use their power (as noted earlier) to 
secure economic profit and protection against rule of law (Leithner and Meissner 2018:188-191, De 
Waal 2016:4-5). The issue of state capture and favouritism on the macro level has several spill over 
effects. Firstly, it makes bureaucracy less efficient, among other because resources are unequally 
distributed. Secondly, this builds and maintains the population’s distrust towards the state 
authorities and institutions. Third, this in turn encourages people to use informal networks (Åberg 




but to much less degree linking SC as the latter can (and is in this thesis) be seen as formal networks 
involving officials. This does not exclude, however, the corruption occurring in linking SC. 
Whether and how informal networks effect bridging and linking capabilities requires more research. 
However, what is likely is that because this governance situation and these features in network have 
existed for a long time in Ukraine (even before Soviet times), the population’s ability to perform 
civic engagement remains low. In Åberg’s (2000:301) study on SC in western Ukraine, a survey in 
1994 revealed that 52.8% of the respondents in L’viv and 60.5% of the respondents in Donetsk 
replied that they were either little interested or indifferent to politics. In contrast, an overwhelming 
majority of the samples in the survey stated that they would vote in the coming parliamentary 
election that year (ibid). Åberg (ibid:302-303) noted that people in Ukraine overall had in general 
very little experience in civic engagement, but that in general L’viv had around twice the percentage 
of people with experience in civic engagement compared to those in Donetsk19.  
Another example of people’s inexperience with civic engagement, and more specifically on 
understanding the issues of corruption, is the statement from Oleksiy Chornyy who opened an anti-
corruption agency in Odessa: “People don’t understand what corruption is... At first people came 
[to our agency] with any old complaints, such as problems with their neighbours or unjust court 
judgments. After two months we understood it wasn’t working” (De Waal 2016:2-3). 
Going back to the third spill over effect noted, is the issue that due to the clientelism on 
macro-level and the level of distrust in the central authority on meso-level and micro level, people 
resort to informal networks (Leitner and Meissner 2018:191) (Åberg 2000:307). This implicates 
that coordinated actions through social relations in Ukrainian society (ref. definition of SC) works 
by using family, friends and acquaintances (i.e. bonding, but in some cases also bridging SC) in 
horizontal and reciprocal exchange relations to carry out practical problem solving and successfully 
going about their business (ibid:307-308). Such networks in society, however, have both positive 
and negative sides. On one hand, this kind of exchange relations might have the ability to build trust 
and extend networks provided networks are not only contained to bonding SC and specific bridging 
SC. If so, then it may also expand to bridging SC and later over to linking SC. One the other hand, 
the type of exchange relations this SC is built upon don’t facilitate collective agency and trust in a 
situation where non-authoritarian and less vertical formal institutions are attempted (ibid:307). 
More importantly, complex, large-scale societies (e.g. on a national level) can’t be administered 
efficiently through only personal contacts and direct links between members of society (ibid:308). 
Åberg’s point here, which is relevant in not just Ukrainian society, is that one needs formal 
                                                 
19 An exception was regarding participation in demonstration in which L’viv respondents showed 40 % (compared to 
Donetsk’ 12.6%). Åberg (2000:302) notes that this may be due to the mass rallies in 1988 and the demonstrations 




institutions and functioning linking SC to facilitate and manage complex procedures in a modern 
society, e.g. taxes, infrastructure as well as health and education-systems to mention just a few. 
Furthermore, in order for formal institutions to function they need some level of trust. While 
combating corruption is one aspect, identity formation is arguably another aspect in building trust. 
In the governance section of this chapter, we note the historical divide between the eastern 
and southern versus the central and western regions. In terms of identity formation, Ukraine is an 
interesting case. Although the regions in Ukraine have diverging historical backgrounds, which 
shaped the different compositions of ethnicities in each region (see figure 9) as well as their 
respective national consciousness, and although Ukraine went through a nation-building process 
after its independency in 1991, the distinction between identities in east and west Ukraine is by far 
not so black-white. It is, in fact, quite complex. 
 
Figure 9. From Janmaat (2000:19). Statistics from 2001 show a similar composition but with an 





Firstly, in contrast to the Soviet ethnic policies, Ukraine has not politicised ethnicity to 
degree that Soviet did. In Soviet times, policies assigned ethnic identity to citizens at birth and made 
them report their identity whenever applying for jobs or positions in higher education. The Soviet 
Union also established its 15 republics as internal national homelands - each one named after the 
dominant nationality, for example Ukraine for Ukrainians. As such, the Soviet state promoted a 
system of ethnic classification on two levels: 1) an ethnocultural/personal level, and 2) a territorial 
level (Giuliano 2018).  
In comparison to the Soviet Union, ethnic identities did not become politicised in Ukraine 
through the 1990s and early 2000s, and the government did not condition citizenship on cultural 
practice or ethnic ancestry (ibid). People have the freedom to choose their personal identities, 
religion as well as language. In east and south Ukraine, people continued using Russian while in 
west Ukraine people continued speaking Ukrainian. The change in language policy was that 
Ukrainian language (previously subordinated to Russian in Soviet times) was gradually introduced 
into primary education. Today most Ukrainians are bilingual (ibid).  
Looking through the research of Hrytsak (1998), Åberg (2000), Kulyk (2016), and Polese 
(2018), the overall issue with identity formation is not so much about ethnicity alone but how 
national identity is conceived and conveyed through politics. Kulyk (2016:592) notes that towards 
the 2000s the perception of identity gradually increased in preferences of national identity rather 
than subnational level. In a survey from 1997, this preference was roughly equal. In 2006, national 
identity clearly overshadowed subnational identities (ibid). However, the degree to the importance 
of the identity as “Ukrainian” still differed between west Ukraine vs. east and south Ukraine (ibid, 
Hrytsak 1998:274-277). Based on these surveys, we see that the formation of national identity is in 
general moving towards a more unified national conscious identity.  
However, subnational identities still matter. Polese (2018:11) notes the acceptance of 
Ukrainian identity differs between L’viv and Odessa, as well as difference between older and 
younger generations. Another interesting duality on identity in Ukraine is the consequences of 
language policies since the 1990s. In his article on Ukrainian identity in Odessa, Polese (2018:5-7) 
looks at informal nationalism in which national identities are constructed and renegotiated on every 
level through ordinary citizens. People switch between Russian and Ukrainian in several contexts, 
several times a day. In the classroom, teachers have to teach in Ukrainian even though they 
sometimes need to translate it into Russian. Then if pupils can’t reply in Ukrainian, they do so in 
Russian and then the teacher answers in Russian. This constricted and seemingly artificial usage of 
the Ukrainian language reflects the dichotomy between formal and informal settings in the 
Ukrainian language in society. The dichotomy appears like a formal/official game in which 




public spaces) even though everybody quickly switches back to Russian as soon as they can. 
Eventually the “incidental” use of Russian leads to it being used more frequently, which makes the 
gap between theory (the state instructions) and practice more visible. Overall, the language situation 
seems to be an inconvenient practice at best, but can, if exploited in the long term, be precarious at 
worst. Using Ukrainian becomes thus functional to give an impression, to “construct a façade of 
Ukrainianess” (ibid:7). The big challenge in this is when the difference between how the state and 
its institutions conceive national identity versus how the people in different regions of Ukraine 
perceive it, becomes too big. According to Polese (ibid:13), this depends on the flexibility (the 
mediation and compromise) on different levels in society from national parliament, technocratic, to 
local (macro, meso, micro). 
In terms of SC, promoting bilingual conditions through education can serve as a unifier in 
formation of national identity. It can also act as a facilitator for bridging and linking SC since both 
languages are needed in different parts of Ukraine as well as in different work sectors (notably in 
the public sector). On the other hand, forcing one language to dominate another in a region or area 
where it is not the main spoken language, could cause an opposite effect. If pushed too far it could 
also lead to more resistance by those it is forced upon. Then in the long term, it might not have a 
positive effect on the formation of a unified national identity. The fact that the “constructed façade 
of Ukrainianess” is so apparent in the education sector is of concern. Education such as school, 
comprises a big part of a person’s early life and can have a great impact on the formation of an 
individual’s identity, values and cognitive behaviour depending on how the education interacts with 
issues that matter the most to that individual’s identity (Kaplan and Flum 2012, Agirdag et al 
2011:208-210, Feliciano 2009:150-152). If language is big part of an individual’s identity and that 
individual feels their own language is being marginalised, then education might not yield the best 
opportunities for unifying a national identity based on one language. 
Together with language, the politics of national identity become problematized when shifts 
in governments either with west or east Ukrainian backing promote and conduct policies that are in 
favour of one region or the other. Kulyk (2016:607) describes Ukrainian society for a decade after 
the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005, as characterised by the uneasy coexistence of two roughly 
equal territorial halves with their respective divergent identities and policy preferences. In this 
sense, the Euromaidan in 2014 become for one part an empowerment of the Ukrainian people, those 
who tend to be proud of their belonging to the Ukrainian nation. For the other part, it became 
another stage to their deprivation as a new government furthered their frustration with the state 
which has allegedly abandoned them, even if they’re not necessarily less fond of the country or its 




In 2017, the president and the parliament passed a law on education that bans the use of 
minority languages for instruction in schools after 5th grade by 2020 (Giuliano 2019). This means 
that the approximately 621 Russian-language schools, 78 Romanian-language schools, and 68 
Hungarian-language schools in Ukraine will have to adapt quickly or face penalties. Furthermore, 
one provision of the law allows certain subjects at Ukrainian-language schools to be taught in 
European languages, such as Hungarian and Romanian, but not in Russian. This led to charges of 
discrimination from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission (ibid). Another case is the 
separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), which is 
affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. While the majority of Ukraine’s population does not 
attend church, the political symbolism was profound. President Poroshenko, who led the push for 
autocephaly, described the achievement in overtly political terms as “a question of our 
independence, national security, statehood, a question of world geopolitics.” (ibid).  
Such cases of policies increase polarisation and politicise identity through language and 
religion. These cases also increases estrangement from new authorities in Kiev towards eastern 
Ukrainians. Looking back to the issue of corruption in Ukraine, Leitner and Meissner (2018:191) 
note that there is a spatial difference in the scope of corruption in Ukraine. Although a common 
feature in all Ukrainian regions is a general distrust of the population against the authorities and 
state institutions, there is some degree of difference in the levels of trust. In the eastern regions, only 
10.4% of the respondents in a survey by Kiev International Institute of Sociology trusted those 
authorities, while in the western regions the percentage was 24.7 (ibid). 
In summary, there are many differences in Ukrainian society, which overlap making it 
complex. While national, regional and individual opinions on issues such as language, religion, 
national identity, as well as politics, represent many divisions in Ukrainian society they do not 
necessarily lead to conflict. However, such divisions together with a generally high distrust in the 
authority can make a society vulnerable to conflicts if such differences in society are provoked and 
put pressure on – for example through polarising policies and/or foreign interventions. As we will 












4.3 A brief overview of the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine 
The conflict in Crimea and Ukraine is seen by many as not just a turning point in the 
political relations between Russia and the west, but also for the popularity of the term hybrid 
warfare (HW) and hybrid threats (HT) (Tsygankov 2015:279, Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015:1, 7, 
McDermott et al. 2015:41). Russia’s actions in the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine is often 
described by NATO as HT (Reisinger and Golts 2014:3). In contrast, Russia views the terms HW 
and HT as a western concept, mainly described to be used against Russia (Wigell 2019:260, 
Russian Times 2019). Different actors in the conflict have perceived the conflict differently, and 
throughout the conflict there have been extensive disinformation campaigns promoting different 
narratives of the conflict (Lazarenko 2018:1-3). The narratives in the conflict are mainly divided 
between Russia and Ukraine. These narratives will be discussed further in section 4.3.3. There is 
bias on all sides and the narratives are highly politicised. In this chapter (and the thesis overall), we 
will not go into the discussion on Russian-West20 relations, but instead look at the events which 
occurred during the conflict. The events listed in the following sections are mainly from western 
institutions (e.g. NATO, Hybrid CoE, NUPI) and media sources. The reason for this is that in 
general there is a greater diversity in western sources in their ability to be both biased but also 
critical. The critical literature in this case has been more useful in this thesis.  
It is important for the reader to note that during the conflict in 2014, Russia’s degree of 
involvement was uncertain and much of information on Russian involvement presented in this 
chapter comes from sources after the events had enfolded. The political concerns and tensions 
between Russia and Ukraine increased after the Orange revolution and with the presidency of 
Viktor Yushchenko (2004-2010). Meanwhile, the crisis itself can be said to have begun with the 
Euromaidan leading to the removal of then president Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) 22nd 
February 2014 after his decision to postpone an Association Agreement with the EU in the fall of 
2013 (Tsygankov 2015:284-285, Reisinger and Golts 2014:1). The day Yanukovych was ousted, 
Russian special forces Spetsnaz began deploying to Crimea. 
However, as Einar Seljevold (2015:14) explains, Russia might have planned the intervention 
of Crimea and the support of the separatists in eastern Ukraine long before and just used these 
events as an excuse. Whatever Russia’s real motives were, this thesis will now give a brief 
overview of the events in the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, including the diverging 
narratives in the conflict. 
 
 
                                                 





The intervention of Crimea began, as mentioned in end of February as Spetsnaz (Russian 
military intelligence infantry) started deploying to Crimea. On the 24th February, Sevastopol city 
council appointed the Russian citizen and businessperson, Aleksei Chaliy, as mayor. The following 
days, Russian naval units arrived in the city square. On February 26th, Russia conducted a snap 
exercise of 150 000 troops from the Western and Central Military Districts - possibly to draw 
attention away from their operations on Crimea as well as intimidate the Ukrainian government 
(Treverton et al. 2018:16, Seljevold 2015:14). However, Russia said the exercise was not related to 
the events in Ukraine (Higgins and Myers 2014, Gutterman 2014). Meanwhile, the masked men 
(the “little green men”), claiming to be local “self-defence militia”, occupied the Crimean 
Parliament and raised the Russian flag (Treverton et al. 2018:16, Seljevold 2015:14, Reisinger and 
Golts 2014:3). At the time it was not clear who these little green men were as they did not wear any 
identifying signatures on their fatigues. Russia, especially in the beginning, also denied any 
involvement.  
This ambiguous situation was (in aftermath) a very clear tactic of uncertainty – a core 
feature in HT (Bukkvoll and Åtland 2015:89, Reisinger and Golts 2014:4). The new Crimean 
parliament decided to vote for holding a referendum on Crimea’s status on 25th May (same day as 
Ukraine’s presidential elections). Over the next few days, Russian troops seized more and more 
strategic facilities on Crimea. On 1st March, Putin requested parliamentary approval to use troops in 
Ukraine to protect the Black Sea Fleet and ethnic Russians who faced “real threats to their life and 
health” (Treverton et al. 2018:17), but still by the 4th March Putin denied any Russian troops being 
involved (Seljevold 2015:14). The 6th March, Russian Ochakov Kara-class cruiser blocked the exit 
to the Black Sea. Same day, parliament moved the date of the referendum to March 16th. During the 
following week, the Russian troops continued to seize other military bases on Crimea without much 
resistance. Eventually, they managed to cut off and isolate the peninsula – giving them the effective 
control over Crimea (Treverton et al. 2018:17). The 16th March the referendum was held, resulting 
with over 96% vote in favour of joining Russia. The referendum was not recognised internationally 
but Putin recognised it and signed the treaty stating that Crimea is annexed by Russia (Seljevold 
2015:14). 21st March, Crimea became formally annexed, ten days after it declared independency 









4.3.2 Eastern Ukraine 
While Russia used the similar elements in their operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, 
the operations had different goals and Crimea followed a more conventional “covert” method of 
invasion using their own troops synchronised with a propaganda campaign. In the operations in 
eastern Ukraine, Russia took a more ambiguous strategy by mainly supporting the separatists. 
(Bukkvoll and Åtland 2015:89, Treverton et al. 2018:14-15). In the beginning, Russia utilised 
political campaigns by encouraging an anti-government movement and using people of power to 
oppose the Ukrainian government (Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015:7, Treverton et al. 2018:21). 
When the Ukrainian government arrested protest leaders, they escalated the situation. Eventually, 
this sparked a separatist insurgency, which then turned to irregular warfare. Stepping it up, Russia 
began supporting the separatists with conventional reinforcements using its own troops (Treverton 
et al. 2018:21).  
On the 23rd February 2014, Ukraine changed the official status of the Russian language. This 
was problematic in eastern Ukraine where the majority speaks Russian. Altogether, the 
Euromaidan, removal of Yanukovych, the new language policy, and later Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea amounted to an increasingly agitated situation. Protests broke out as a response to the 
uncertainty of Ukraine’s political future, making it easier for Russia to exploit. (Treverton et al. 
2018:21). The 1st March 2014, pro-Russia demonstrators began seizing the regional government HQ 
buildings in Kharkiv and Donetsk from pro-Maidan occupiers. The same happened in Luhansk, the 
9th March. The Russian flag was hoisted and the protesters demanded a referendum regarding 
Russia’s annexation. Across eastern Ukraine, similar demands for referendums occurred, also 
including recognising Russian as an official state language, and creating a Customs Union with 
Russia (ibid:22). Ukraine’s counteractions with arresting protest leaders backfired when self-
proclaimed governors and mayors without much experience were replaced by those who did have 
more experience. Moreover, these people also had ties to Russian security services, military 
backgrounds, and business interests with Russia. These people were more capable and willing to 
use direct action and command paramilitary forces (ibid:22-23). The separatists gained more and 
more control.  
Another challenge the Ukrainian government had, was that the separatists bribed and 
intimidated political officials to either adopt to a pro-Russian stance or leave their position. This 
was also part of the case with the Ukrainian military, in which soldiers were targeted with bribes, 
intimidation through their phones, and local pressure (ibid:23). The Ukrainian military also 
struggled with efficiency, organisation and motivation. During April, the Ukrainian military forces 
launched counter-attacks as a response the separatists’ gains. However, the Ukrainian military 




military was also lacking in numbers and poorly equipped, and many soldiers refused to shoot at 
fellow Ukrainians (Reisinger and Golts 2014:8-9, Treverton et al. 2018:23). The latter is an 
interesting issue, regarding to the role of the military in internal conflict, as mentioned in chapter 2 
(page 14). However, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the Ukrainian military did not revolt against its 
government or dissolve, respectively. 
Throughout April and May 2014, fights/battles continued between separatists and pro-
Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian forces continued to launch attacks in Mariupol and northeast of 
Donetsk but these were also very inefficient. Blockades were also attempted to isolate the 
separatists, but this failed as the separatists still managed to receive support from Russia. 11th May, 
“self-rule” referendums were held in Donetsk and Luhansk to establish new, independent republics. 
In Donetsk, the support for self-rule was 89%, while in Luhansk 96% (Blair 2014). 25th May, Petro 
Poroshenko won the election for prime minister of Ukraine, replacing Yulia Tymoshenko whom 
took over after Yanukovych. The following day, the first battle for Donetsk airport began, marking 
a turning point in the conflict. Ukrainian forces were able to push the separatists out of the 
Donetsk’s international terminal with air strikes and a paratrooper assault. Larger groups of 
volunteers from Russia joined and reinforced the separatists. Meanwhile, more Russian soldier were 
directly supporting the separatists, also marking a turning point in the conflict (Treverton et al. 
2018:23-24). 
Following June to August, the conflict escalated as Russia supplied the separatists with 
mechanised equipment, armour, advanced munitions, and medium air defences. The effective air 
defence caused many losses for the Ukrainian air force, ending their operability by Mid-August. 
Yet, Ukrainian ground forces managed to fight back the separatists and on 5th July they recaptured 
several towns held by separatists, pushing them back to their strongholds in Donetsk and Luhansk 
(ibid:24). Eventually, by August, Ukraine recaptured around 75% of the territory that was held by 
separatists. The Ukrainian forces were close to regaining border control and closing inn/surrounding 
the separatists. Meanwhile, Donetsk and Luhansk also risked being split as Ukrainian forces created 
a wedge between them (ibid:24-25). 
As Russia’s strategy was failing, they decided to launch a conventional invasion in the 
period 14th to 24th August, deploying somewhere between 1000 and 4000 Russian troops to support 
the separatists. Still, Russia denied any involvement until 10 Russian paratroopers were captured by 
Ukrainian troops, leading Russia merely claim they crossed the border accidently (BBC 2014). 
Eventually, separatists regained pressure on the airports in Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as 
threatening Mariupol again near the end of August. On the 5th September, negotiations, referred to 
as Minsk I, led to a signed ceasefire between the separatists and Ukrainian forces. However, Russia, 




launched artillery strikes and the separatists (with Russian backing) seized Donetsk airport 
(Treverton et al. 2018:25). The 12th February 2015, the two parties met again in Minsk and agreed 
to a second ceasefire, referred to as Minsk II. This deal favoured the separatists and Russia by 
giving a constitutional reform, which decentralises the separatist regions and adopt permanent laws 
on the special status of those areas (Oliphant 2015, BBC 2015). Six days later, the Ukrainian troops 
retreated from Debaltseve under enemy fire. Ukraine began implementing its Minsk II obligations 
by July 2015. Russia continued to arm and train the separatists as well as providing support with 
their own troops. Throughout the rest of 2015 and early 2016, the fighting ensued with varying 
intensity (Treverton et al. 2018:26). 
As of April 2019, the conflict is still ongoing. While less intense, it is steady and so far the 
conflict has claimed over 13 000 causalities, whereof 3 000 are civilians (Miller 2019). Over 1.7 
million people have been displaced (Treverton et al. 2018:26). The fighting continues along an ad-
hoc border stretching around Donetsk and Luhansk between the Ukrainian government and the 
Russian-backed separatists (ibid). Overall, the situation of the Minsk II agreement is that it has 
stagnated, if not completely failed (Beck 2018). 
 
4.3.3 Diverging narratives in the conflict 
Throughout the conflict, Russia used its special forces for insurgency, its conventional 
forces for intimidation and for backup of separatists, in addition to economic and political pressure 
(from offering lifelines amid instability and discounts on gas imports to threatening with shutting 
off the gas supply) (Reisinger and Golts 2014:3-10, Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015:7-8, Treverton et 
al. 2018:29, Kramer 2014).  
As mentioned earlier, the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine was also marked by massive 
disinformation campaigns on both fronts. In her article on the multiplicity of narratives about the 
conflict and displacement in Ukraine since 2014), Lazarenko (2018) noted that there are different 
competing narratives in Ukraine regarding the conflict. On one side is the main Ukrainian strategic 
narrative, distributed through the media and the speeches of state authorities. In this narrative, 
Russia is portrayed as an invader conducting its imperialistic policies, threatening Ukraine’s 
struggle for freedom. The civil protest of the Euromaidan is framed as the protest against the highly 
corrupt regime of then president Yanukovych and how his refusal to sign the association agreement 
with EU deprived Ukrainians of their expectations. When Yanukovych fled to Russia, Ukraine 
started building a new democratic state. This is when Russia intervened in Crimea and later in east 
Ukraine. Moreover, this narrative emphasise historical events (e.g. crimes from Soviet era) and 




On the other side, the official Russian narrative is grounded in two main points: 1) the 
incorporation of Crimea as a historical justice, and 2) the protection of the Russian-speakers in the 
diaspora (which fitted with Russian-language speakers based on the new language policies) (ibid:5-
6). Russia used historical narratives to discredit the Kyiv government as “fascist”, using every 
possible channel to undermine Ukraine’s democracy (Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015:8). The 
Euromaidan was also framed as a coup d’état where democratically elected Yanukovych was taken 
from power as a result of extremist neo-Nazi involvement together with direct Western involvement 
(USA and EU) (Lazarenko 2018:6). Denial of Russian involvement in the conflict is also an 
important part (Reisinger and Golts 2014:5). 
In these two opposing narratives, the conflict was described to its audience through 
simplified versions of the ongoing events, which pulled on the diverging issues as mentioned in the 
previous section. A third narrative put these events in a geopolitical framing between the West 
(NATO and EU) and East (Russia) as a prolongation of the Cold War (Lazarenko 2018:9, 12-13). 
Another challenge with these conflicting narratives is that Russian media generally resonates more 
in east Ukraine than in west (Helmus et al. 2018:16, 58-59, Bukkvoll and Åtland 2015:89). Without 
going into a discussion on media’s role in HT, the point here is that these media discourses 
increased existing tensions within society and have made trust and reconciliation-building even 
more tangled (Lazarenko 2018:13). 
Chapter 5 will further analyse the case study of Crimea and Ukraine in relation to the 



















CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS: ASSESSING GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL 
CAPITAL IN HYBRID THREATS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The research question in this thesis is “how can the concepts of governance and social 
capital contribute to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to further expose a society’s 
vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT?” Through the chapters so far in this 
thesis, we have looked at the theoretical concepts of governance and social capital (SC), explored 
the MCDC-report’s understanding and analytical framework of HT, as well as looked at the 
governance and social capital situation in Ukraine in relation to the conflict since 2014. 
This chapter will first look at how the conflict in Ukraine is analysed through the MCDC-
report’s analytical framework and in that regard discuss their analytical framework. Following this, 
the findings in this thesis’ case study will be analysed to see how governance and SC can expose a 
society’s vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT. The chapter ends with a 
suggestion for possible questions that can be used to assess governance and SC in a society, and 
how one can create a baseline assessment for governance and social capital in the MCDC-report’s 
framework.  
 
5.2 The Ukraine case in the MCDC-report’s analytical framework 
In the MCDC-report, the authors use the conflict in Ukraine as an example of how their 
analytical framework can be applied. In their empirical case study, they begin by listing the 
vulnerabilities inherent to Ukraine and then the vulnerabilities created intentionally by Russia. 
Secondly, they identify two synchronised attack packages (SAP 1 and SAP 2). Briefly explained, 
SAPs are specific military, political, economic, civilian, and/or informational (MPECI) instruments 
of power that are synchronised and tailored to specific vulnerabilities that are used in a HT attack 
(Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2016b:32). Figure 10 is a summary of their identification on 
vulnerabilities and SAPs. In figure 11 we see how they have illustrated these identifications into 





Figure 10. Identified vulnerabilities and synchronised attack packages (SAP) 
 
 






In their analysis the vulnerabilities are centred on the economic aspects of Ukraine, the 
economic relations between Ukraine and Russia (particularly Ukraine’s dependency on Russia 
regarding gas and loans, and how Russia used these economic vulnerabilities to gain political 
influence. In their empirical case they look at how Russia in 2014 used a combination of political 
pressure and compensation (push-pull tactics) with cheap gas and loans to get then-president 
Yanukovych to abandon the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (Cullen and 
Reichborn-Kjennerud 2016b:17). Then as the Euromaidan progressed and a new, pro-Western 
government came into power, the strategic environment had changed. This meant that Russia had to 
adapt their use of MPECI-instruments of power. However, the identified vulnerabilities were still 
there. Russia continued using these push/pull tactics - coercive and escalatory, and compensatory 
and de-escalatory – by offering and cancelling loans as well as increasing and decreasing gas prices 
(ibid). These economic tools were used in synchronisation with military and informational 
instruments of power (as shown in chapter 4). For example, before the Minsk agreements Russia 
would either offer cheaper gas and loans, or threaten with supply shortage and repayments in debt, 
while escalating their military efforts.  
These push and pull tactics were part of Russia’s strategy to create ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the conflict. Ukraine’s economic and political vulnerabilities made its ability to 
handle such situations very low. Russia’s strategy was effective. First, it led to the abandonment of 
the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement by then-president Yanukovych. Then, during the political 
and social chaos during and after the Euromaidan, Russia annexed Crimea and adapted its tactics to 
the new government in place. Looking at figure 11, we see these tactics being used and how 
Russia’s strategy adapts from phase one to two. With this visualisation of their analytical 
framework, the MCDC-report provides a good understanding of HT as non-linear threats that target 
vulnerabilities utilising different instruments of power. Moreover, it allows us to monitor threats 
and events in contemporary/real time.  
The MCDC-report states that “while this section is only a limited outline of a very complex 
conflict it shows how the Analytical Framework can be used to further our understanding of how 
tailor-made synchronised attack packages work against specific contextual vulnerabilities in a 
target system” (ibid:19). Moreover, they explain what the targeted actor needs to do is to: 
1) Assess its critical functions and vulnerabilities. 
2) Once these are identified, thresholds must be established to monitor changes in the 
functional status. Thresholds help identify and define the severity of HT by creating 
predetermined levels (e.g. from normality to crisis) along with the magnitude or intensity 




3) Specific indicators should also be built in to determine if and when HT are occurring. 
Through this, a baseline assessment is made to identify and separate what is normal from 
what is likely an attack.  
These three notions (from their report, ibid:20) lay the foundation for monitoring and 
countering HT. The highlighted connections and visualisation of the relation between 
vulnerabilities, instruments of power/means, and effects is the strength of the analytical framework 
in the MCDC-report. The framework makes it easier for us to create a baseline and a system for 
monitoring potential vulnerabilities, distinguish a “normal” situation versus a HT attack, the 
severity of an attack, and possibly how to counter it.  
There are two issues that can be pointed out on this analytical framework, which, are 
arguably important to consider. Firstly, the analytical framework can only be as good as the report it 
is based on; meaning when vulnerabilities are listed, as in phase one (reliance on Russian gas and 
debt to Russia) we understand why these are vulnerabilities. However, when vulnerabilities are 
listed as political leadership and social cohesion we need more information to further explain what 
this means as well as why and how these are vulnerabilities. This brings us back to the point in 
chapter 3 (page 32), where the analytical framework lacks a deeper analysis for how society 
(represented through their PMESII spectrum) functions and how certain features in society make 
the critical functions more susceptible to vulnerabilities that can be targeted in HT. When the 
MCDC-report notes “social cohesion and political leadership” as vulnerabilities, we need to 
understand what this means and what role social relationships (which social cohesion and political 
leadership is a part of) play in HT and have this into the analytical framework. 
Secondly, the listed vulnerabilities “political leadership and social cohesion” would arguably 
have an effect on how the targeted actor can assess and identify vulnerabilities, as well as develop a 
baseline based on the identified vulnerabilities. For example if the vulnerability is state corruption, 
which involves those in charge of making the baseline, possibly with the result that such 
vulnerabilities are less likely to be addressed. This was exemplified in Ukraine where the 
government and the parliament (where much of the corruption lies) decidedly underfunded and 
poorly staffed the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (de Waal 2016:6-7). The issue of 
countering HT is then challenged from the start. The point here is the process of assessing 









5.3 The role of governance and social capital in Ukraine 
In their case study, the MCDC-report identifies political leadership and social cohesion as 
vulnerabilities in phase two. Looking at chapter 4 in this thesis, we can agree with this. There are 
evident challenges in the Ukrainian political system that pose a vulnerability for Ukraine. In the 
MCDC-report, they refer to the vulnerabilities in political and social divisions as social cohesion. 
However, what do these vulnerabilities mean and why are they vulnerabilities? Below, Ukraine’s 
governance and SC situation from chapter 4 is summarised in four notes to highlight those issues 
that will be further discussed in relation to governance and SC. 
1. Regional differences: Ukraine consists of four regions (East, South, Central and West) that 
have had different historical and politically cultural developments. This has led to not only 
different regional identities but also different perceptions towards the central government in 
Ukraine, which also depends on who is in government and which region they are from. 
2. Political system: Since its independence, Ukraine has had several challenges in the 
transition from a Soviet system to democracy. Firstly, political power is strongly centralised 
and during the year under president Kuchma (1994-2004) was seen as semi-authoritarian, 
characterised through; intimidation, loyal parties competing for favours, poorly functioning 
legislatives with little power, a semi-free media with self-censorship, and a state 
involvement in, and over-regulation of, the economy. Secondly, corruption also plagues the 
political system in Ukraine in which power is concentrated into one entity in the government 
(the president and his close network) rather than having it distributed through the different 
entities in government and other public sectors. The rule of law remains weak, 
institutionalisation of democratic norms is paltry, the historical experience of democracy is 
weak, and the executive presents itself as standing above party politics. Few people are 
experienced and proficient in civil engagement. 
3. Civilian society: With the public institutions being weak, the incentives are higher for the 
civilians to use informal networks based on bonding SC (i.e. family, friends and other close 
connections) and to some extent (bridging SC, i.e. acquaintances) rather than (public) formal 
networks such as linking SC in order to live their lives and mobilise through society. In 
addition, when formal networks are used, they may often involve corruption (e.g. bribery) of 
officials – representing bridging and/or linking SC based illegal procedures. This type of 
exchange relations the SC is based upon (especially in linking SC) do not facilitate 
collective agency and trust in a situation where non-authoritarian and less vertical formal 
institutions are attempted. The use of such informal networks rather than formal, may have a 
negative cause-effect cycle on people’s trust in government and public institutions overall. 




administer well the complex functions that modern societies comprise of – be it taxes, 
infrastructure, or health and education-systems.  
4. Identity politics: While towards the 2000s the perception of identity has gradually increased 
in preferences of national identity rather than subnational level (e.g. regional identity), the 
latter still matters. Moreover, policies in the recent years have posed some tensions and 
challenges towards the process of building a unified national identity. Language policies that 
are perceived as unfair, or even further as an act of linguistic assimilation by some, can 
cause more tension between different groups of people in the different regions in Ukraine. 
This is especially true for those where language constitutes a bigger part of their identity. As 
such, nation building and the politics of national identity can be a challenging issue in 
countries like Ukraine, which comprise of people with different regional identities. It should 
be noted, however, that regional identities are not simply divided between the four regions 
but also represent varying degrees of differences between the composure of Ukrainian-
speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Russians, etc. within 
each region. The different language groups also don’t necessarily agree on the same issues 
in politics and policies. As such, it is important to recognise the complexity of identities and 
opinions on identity politics. 
We will now look at these four notes in light of the descriptions of governance and SC. For a 
brief review, governance is about the structure of societies. It can be viewed through power-
relationships between the entities involved in it (how power is shared and exercised), and through 
the accountability in the system (how decision makers and other entities involved are accountable to 
each other and how this can facilitate legitimacy and ownership within the society). Social capital is 
about the features of social relations based on networks, identity formation, and trust, which have an 
effect on the efficiency of coordinated actions through social relations in a society. By “the 
efficiency of coordinated actions”, we mean how society is able to coordinate certain tasks in order 
to function as a society. Governance and SC are both about social relationships and concern how 
the entities involved in the social relationships interact. The main difference is that governance is 
more oriented towards the structure and institutionalised aspects of how power is shared and its 
accountability, while SC is more oriented towards the basis and nature of the social relationships – 
what they are based upon and how they are maintained.   
In terms of governance, the regional differences together with the political system in 
Ukraine makes for an uneven power-relationship in which power is concentrated by a smaller group 
of those in power on the national level. Likewise, the centralised power makes for an uneven 
power-relationship between the people and the politicians, including other higher officials in public 




and balances in the Ukrainian government and between the five sectors (see figure 2) are not highly 
functioning – making horizontal accountability low. On the issue of vertical accountability, the 
situation is in one way certain and in another way uncertain. On one hand, people do not seem to 
have enough power to change the political system and do not expect any changes to the status of 
corruption and weak public institutions since this has been the situation for a long time. It is 
difficult for accountability to develop if there are few or no proper practices for accountability 
(vertical and/or horizontal). If there is little influence from the people to the state (vertical) and/or 
little balance of powers within the state (horizontal), then it is less likely that accountability can be 
high in a society. Power-relationships will also be less likely to be balanced. Whether this is 
favourable for those involved, is another issue. It depends on the socio-political culture and how 
governance is perceived. Do the people in the society favour a “strongman leader” or a more 
“collective decision making leadership”? Either style of governance experience different challenges 
that can be exploited in HT. 
 The people can exercise their right to vote and oust presidents. However, the political 
situation is unstable and the recent political developments after the Euromaidan have created many 
uncertainties. For example the recently elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is a comedian with 
no political experience who has built his campaign on his difference from the other candidates 
rather than any concrete policy ideas (BBC 2019). Though he promises to combat corruption, many 
question his ties with the oligarch billionaire Ihor Kolomoisky (ibid). 
Overall, the accountability in Ukrainian governance is somewhat uncertain as the power-
relationships are uneven and accountability is uncertain. In certain aspects, authoritarian regimes 
can contrast the accountability in democracy as authoritarian regimes can sometimes be more 
efficient in their governance due to there being little or no opposition against them. Nevertheless, a 
challenge in Ukraine is that their political system is somewhere in between. The political system 
seems to be not “democratic” enough to gain legitimacy and support from the entire population, but 
neither authoritarian enough to deter all opposition and effectively carry out their policies. The 
Euromaidan’s result in ousting the president and the military’s inefficiency (e.g. soldiers defecting 
and vulnerability to pressure, Treverton et al. 2018:23) are some of the examples of this. 
In terms of social capital, the uneven power-relationships and uncertain accountability in the 
public institutions could seem to foster and maintain the people’s preference for using informal 
networks to possibly compensate for the lack of a functioning formal networks in linking SC and to 
some extent bridging SC. An example of the relation between the deficit of trust in society and the 
poor functioning of public institutions, can be found in Kurkchiyan’s (2013) study on legal 
procedures in Ukraine’s judicial system, here specifically in courts on civil cases. Below is extract 




“In contrast, the Ukrainian cases demonstrate the judicial difficulties caused by the 
prevalence of cynicism and habitual distrust in everyday life. Those characteristics of social 
relationships tend to spill over from daily life into the courtroom. Inevitably, such a demanding 
social environment inflicts frustration on the judges. To adapt to it, they typically choose not to 
question the reliability of the evidence given by any of the litigants or witnesses, but instead to 
allow cases to be determined solely by certified written documents that are taken at face value even 
though they are not trusted. A similar pattern in the work done by judges has been recorded in 
other countries such as China that also struggle with a deficit of trust (Woo and Wang, 2005).”  
Kurkchiyan (ibid:529) found that Ukraine has not modernised in a way that its bureaucracy 
actually functions. How deep the relations between SC and the functioning of public institutions 
goes, and to what extent this is a case of cause-effect, requires further research. However, it is an 
interesting issue to analyse in the context of HT as we can question what this means to other public 
institutions such as the military and intelligence departments. Another question is if the people do 
not have enough trust in the government and public institutions to begin with, can they trust and 
rely on them in a conflict? Can the people count on the government to handle crises and conflicts? 
Likewise, can the government trust the people in a conflict?  
With the additional issue of subnational identities, building a national identity with national 
narratives becomes a challenge as the different subnational identities may not share the same 
identity, values, narratives and networks as the main governing entity (i.e. the government). The 
sociological distance between the citizens and the governing entity can be a challenge for gaining 
trust, building a unified national identity, as well as forming networks that can make society 
function efficiently. The annexation Crimea and intervention in east Ukraine made all these issues, 
which Ukraine struggled with, more tense altogether. As Popescu (2015:2) stated: “it is hard to 
imagine a more favourable ground: a contested, passive or near-absent sense of Ukrainian identity, 
estrangement from the new authorities in Kiev, a large-scale Russian military and intelligence 
presence in Sevestapol and the domination of Russia-based media outlets. Due to this climate, for it 
was not just easy for Russia, it was almost effortless”. In the Ukraine case, Russia knew and 
understood the regional divisions, the political instability, the tensions caused by recent language 
policies, etc. and used it in their information campaigns during their operations in Crimea and east 
Ukraine (Reisinger and Golts 2014:4-6). Playing on contradicting narratives and polarising subjects 
was an important part of Russia’s HT strategy (ibid:4-8).  
Yet, as Kulyk (2016:600) noted, the Euromaidan and the Russian intervention seems to have 
led to an increased general alienation from Russia and that this constitutes the recent changes in 
Ukrainian identity. Worth noting is also that both the pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan groups were 




group were reluctant to give up their fondness for Russia, more so as they did not consider Russia 
primarily guilty for the current predicament in Ukraine (Kulyk 2016:601). As such, there is no 
clear-cut correlation between pro-Maidan/anti-Maidan and pro-Russia/anti-Russia. Similarly, the 
perception of language amongst people (before and after the events in 2014) is complex. This 
illustrates the non-linearity of HT as Russia (the instigator in this case) could not predict the 
outcomes of their tactics and strategies (which sometimes were unfavourable to them), but needed 
to adapt as they went. Either way, the many complex and conflicting opinions in Ukrainian society 
regarding language and national identity as a whole, as well as politics and the relation between the 
authorities and the people, were enhanced through this conflict. 
 
5.4 What the case of Ukraine tells us about governance and social capital in HT 
Based on the case study, this thesis argues that there are two ways in which the concepts of 
governance and SC can expose a society’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards HT. Firstly, the 
concepts are about society and social relations. As such, if there are already existing challenges in a 
society and in the social relations in that society, then these can expose and influence other 
vulnerabilities in society, which can be exploited by the HT aggressor. Secondly, these concepts 
also play a role in how the targeted is able to respond and counter the HT. This affects the 
efficiency of HT operations and the extent of their effects. These two ways overlap, but will be 
discussed separately. 
 
5.4.1 What governance and SC mean to existing vulnerabilities in democratic society 
The topics in this thesis have been in the context of democratic governance, specifically 
representative and liberal democracy where democracy is based on a representative government and 
liberal values such as freedom of speech, open market economics, and individual rights. While there 
are definitely differences between Ukraine and other democracies in Europe, e.g. in Great Britain, 
Germany and Norway, the main principles in governance and possible challenges are similar. In his 
article on hybrid interference (in this thesis: HT), Wigell (2019:268-273) highlights four features 
that make liberal democracies particularly vulnerable to hybrid interference. 
The first feature is the restrained state in which the principles of protecting individual rights 
restrain democracies, through constitutional mechanisms, from abusing power. The checks and 
balances in terms of horizontal accountability is one example of this. This feature, one of the main 
principles in democratic governance, limit the state in its control of civil society and its ability to 
detect and protect against threats to society. Countering disinformation campaigns and economic 
threats are more challenging as the state must avoid breaching civil rights and freedoms, and cannot 




The second feature is pluralism as democracy is based on the political competition of 
different interests. Such competing forces in politics allow for open debates in society and compete 
for influence on governance in society. This also allows for vulnerabilities as an external actor can 
use different elements of power to polarise a political situation and increase societal divisions 
(ibid:269-270). Referring back to the Ukraine case, there are many divisions in Ukrainian society, 
which overlap making it complex. Together with a generally high distrust in the state authorities, 
this creates several societal vulnerabilities, which can be exploited. Recent language policies, which 
marginalise one part of its society, can be viewed by some as a worsening of the vertical 
accountability. The most recent language policy, was passed by the Ukrainian parliament in end of 
April this year (2019), stating that Ukrainian language must be spoken in Official settings (Luhn 
2019). It also sets the quotas that 90% of new films and television and 50% of books must be in 
Ukrainian (ibid). Signing the legislation into law will be one of the last acts of the resigning 
president Poroshenko before the newly elected Zelenskiy (who has criticised the law) takes over 
(ibid). Such laws risks antagonising even more the significant minority of Russian speakers in 
Ukraine (ibid). 
The third feature in democracy is free media. Free and independent media works as a 
facilitator of the freedom of expression, ensuring the freedom of speech and individuals’ rights and 
liberties. It also acts as part of the checks and balances by facilitating government responsiveness 
and accountability to the people in its society (Wigell:270-271). However, this allows for media to 
become the battlegrounds for political competitions, which can be polarised and cause more tension 
based on existing divisions in society. Disinformation campaigns and “fake news” distorting truths 
of real events while promoting a specific narrative as conducted in the Ukraine case, pose many 
challenges to democracies where everyone has the right to express opinions and share news. In 
comparison, authoritarian regimes can control media to a greater extent. 
The fourth feature in democracy is open economy. Open market economy may not be 
limited to democracies, but it has become a feature closely associated with western democratic 
systems (ibid:271). Among the implications of open economy is securing of rights of property and 
restriction of the state. As mentioned in chapter 3, it also allows more freedom for foreign actors to 
enter and influence another state actor’s national economy (ibid:260, 272). Ukraine’s reliance on 
Russian gas and its debt to Russia is an example of this.  
In summary, we can see that democracies are particularly vulnerable to HT because they, in 
comparison to authoritarian regimes, are more open and susceptible to external influences and 
possible threats. Another issue is that because the governance situation is based on the principles of 
ensuring individual rights, democracies have fewer tools, compared to authoritarian regimes, to 




vulnerabilities in their target’s society. In terms of governance and SC, democracies rely on a more 
balanced situation of power-relationships, which need to be upheld and maintained through 
accountability and fair formal networks that ensure a trust between the people and the government 
and other public institutions. In contrast, the power-relationships in authoritarian societies are 
constricted and controlled by the ruling entity to a higher degree. Governance and SC still matter in 
authoritarian regimes but in a different way.  
As stated in the second feature on what makes liberal democracies particularly vulnerable to 
HT, democracies are based on the political competition of different interests. As such, governance 
in democracies will always have some degree of conflicts as steering a society (governing) requires 
following certain policies that have been chosen over other (previously competed) policies. This 
may leave some in society disappointed. However, such types of divides and conflicts of interest are 
not necessarily negative. It depends on how the process of selecting policies is carried out and how 
this process is perceived by the people in that society. If the process of selecting policies is viewed 
as fair, then the fact that some people in society are disappointed with the decision may not 
necessarily facilitate for any vulnerabilities or make that society more susceptible to HT. This can 
be because the people view the power-relationships and accountability as favourable or acceptable. 
If accountability is deterred, it represents a change in the power-relationships, which can reduce the 
population’s (or at least part of the population’s) rights. In that case, policies then selected over 
other competing policies, can facilitate for further tensions.  
One could say that in the context of HT and vulnerabilities, reductions in the accountability 
of society could facilitate for vulnerabilities to the stability and make the society more susceptible 
to HT. If an external actor chooses to use HT to create further divides in a society, it is easier to do 
so where the power-relationship and accountability already facilitates for divides and tensions in 
that society. Power-relationships and accountability can thus be seen as factors determining (among 
other) whether the competing policies in a democracy may exacerbate vulnerabilities and 
subsequent susceptibility towards HT. In Ukrainian society the power-relationships between the 
entities (government, private sector, citizens) is poorly distributed due to systematic corruption and 
the accountability is low as execution of government policies, through among other bureaucracy, 
are inefficient. Recent language policies, which marginalise one part of its society, can be viewed 
by some as a worsening of the vertical accountability. The most recent language policy, mentioned 
on page 60, is an example of this.  
Regarding SC, the efficiency of coordinated actions may affect how power-relationships and 
accountability in a society is perceived. If the formal networks, such as bureaucracy, are efficient 
and people view it as functioning, ensuring their interests, then this facilitates for more trust in the 




perceived as favourable, and bridging SC (e.g. voluntary organisations exercising civic 
engagement) are common – illustrating a society that facilitates and maintains actively participating 
citizens – then this facilitates for more trust in the system and overall a higher SC.  
However, high levels of SC can be also be problematic to the power-relationships and 
accountability in a society. Chapter 2 mentioned that networks can be exclusive and unaccountable, 
social norms (in this thesis: identity formation) can be oppressive for some, while trust can be 
hugely complicated – depending on individual connections and social contexts. In some social 
contexts, high SC with close ties may foster discrimination and conservatism, causing social 
stagnation and resistance to change. Moreover, if SC is high within a small group of people in a 
society, it could be at the expense of the others in the society who are not part of this small group. 
All these features can in turn facilitate for certain vulnerabilities in a society. Firstly, these features 
can challenge a society’s accountability, e.g. if high SC in limited groups or the majority becomes 
at the expense of other groups or minorities.  
Ukraine provides very visible examples of low SC. To compare, we can briefly touch upon 
an example from a country with relatively high SC, such as Norway (Svendsen and Svendsen 
2016:1-3). Norway also has its challenges in both governance and SC. In 2017, the Norwegian 
government voted to reduce the number of counties in Norway from 19 to 11 (Furunes 2018). This 
involved merging Finnmark county and Troms county. Despite resistance from the majority of the 
population in Finnmark and Troms, the government continued to carry out this plan. The Minister 
of Local Government and Modernisation, Monica Mæland, warned that if Finnmark County did not 
adhere to the plans, she would conduct the merger by force. 14th of May 2018, 87% of the people in 
Finnmark County voted against the merger. Minister Mæland stated that Finnmark County was 
breaking the law and threatened to take the power away from Finnmark and transferring it all to 
Troms County. This agitated the situation. The government did not recognise the votes, nor 
Finnmark as a singular county (ibid). On 21st June 2018, Finnmark county council chose to boycott 
the merger. 23rd March 2019, the government forced the merger, making Finnmark and Troms one 
county from 1st January 2020 (Hansen 2019). 
This example illustrates how countries with overall high SC, also can experience challenges 
if networks (here the political power in the south of Norway) become limited through reduced 
linking SC in this case. The efficiency of coordinated actions may be high, on one side, due to the 
efficiency of bureaucracy, but on the other hand, it may be reduced when the people then oppose 
the decision-making/policies enforced. In terms of governance, the accountability (at least for the 
population in Finnmark) may be reduced as they may perceive their rights to influence governance 




with accountability and possibly then the efficiency of coordinated actions. These struggles can in 
turn facilitate for societal vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards HT. 
Another way to view governance and SC in HT (through the aspect of democracy) is 
stretching a society’s “social contract21” to increase the divide between the people and the state in 
different ways compared to what the social contract in that specific society is built upon in the first 
place and how it developed. In his article, Wigell (ibid:262) refers to this as a wedge strategy – “a 
policy of dividing a target country or coalition, weakening its counterbalancing potential”. 
Whatever, we call it, the point is that HT plays on existing imbalances of power-relationships in 
governance and the disruptions in SC in democracies to weaken the society and exert influence over 
it. Regarding the social contract, we can think of the issue of ownership. Where the social contract 
in democracy meets governance and SC is the issue of ownership the people have towards their 
society. When the situation of governance and SC in a society is viewed as favourable by the people 
in it, it might be more likely that they have an ownership to the society. By ownership, I mean in 
both the functional and emotional aspect. The functional aspect is about whether they (through 
among other elections – see chapter 2, page 15) can influence how their society is governed. The 
emotional aspect is whether they feel a belonging to their society. It is easier to create a wedge in a 
society where the governance and SC situation leaves the people without an ownership to their 
society. When people feel alienated from their government, it could be easier for an external actor 
to use HT to divide the people from their government even more. The case from Norway is an issue 
that could in the long term, if more pressure from the Norwegian government occurs, facilitate for a 
societal vulnerability. Social media movements such as #notmypresident can also be indicators of 
lack of ownership in a society (Gold et al. 2016). 
To reduce this opportunity for the targeting actor, the targeted society needs to ensure that 
those who are part of it perceive the societal structure and social relations within it as favourable. 
How to do so and solve existing vulnerabilities is a challenging and complex task, which will vary 
in each society and context. However, the features of possible vulnerabilities can be observed and 






                                                 
21 The social contract is a theory concerning the legitimacy of the authority of the state (here: government) over the 
people. The contract refers to an agreement where the people surrender some of their freedoms and submit to authority 





5.4.2 What governance and SC mean to a democratic society’s ability to respond and counter HT 
The role of governance in HT becomes more exposed in acute situations than in the 
“normal” or non-HT situation. How the government and other public sectors (e.g. military), as well 
as the civilian sector is organised, works together, matters not only to the decision-making process 
but also to the effectiveness of the decisions made. If the power-relationships between these sectors 
is characterised through competitiveness rather than collaborative, conflict rather than concurrence, 
then the decision-making is less likely to be effective. As such, the responsive capabilities in 
weaker governance is lower and can make the state more susceptible to HT and more challenging 
for them to counter. This makes HT more effective. This is especially if the HT attacks are based on 
the underlying issues behind the conflicts between the different sectors. 
Social capital in conflict and crises plays a similar role as governance but can be more 
directed towards the population’s resiliency against external pressures. In times of crises and 
conflict, people rely on functioning networks to access basic needs but also to solve conflicts. The 
management and developments in conflicts in a society depend not only on the state’s preventative 
actions towards conflicts, but also on the abilities of the people (Gjørv 2019a). If the state authority 
and public institutions are not able to function properly, the question is how informal networks 
through bonding and to some extent bridging will work in the conflict or crisis. The civilian 
population in a society is not merely a bystander in crises and conflicts. The role of civilians in 
conflict and the relations between civilians and the military are complex and many. The people’s 
ability to mobilise through their networks in crises and conflict effects their resilience (ibid). The 
level of civic engagement could thus possibly also be an indicator for how voluntary organisations 
are in crises. In addition to general trust and accountability in a society, cooperation between such 
voluntary organisations, civil defence as well as with the military depend to varying degrees on 
good network relations and certain levels of civic engagement. This is the assumption of Norway’s 
Total Defence concept (Totalforsvaret) of which the Norwegian defence policy is based upon 
(Nystuen 2016, Brekke 2018, Gjørv 2019a, Gjørv 2019b). The ability and capability of resilience, 
thus, can depend on the situation of the social contract and ownership in that society.  
In Ukraine, the social contract between the people and the government has been through 
challenging times – from different regions becoming part of the Russian Empire (and later the 
Soviet Union) in different times, to handling periods of change since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The transition from authoritarianism to democracy takes time, and so it does too for a new 
governance system and SC situation to solidify a social contract. The social contract in Ukraine still 
needs to solidify and mature in order to have a functioning system in which the relations within the 
population and the relations between the people and the government are good enough that 




perceived as favourable by those entities involved, the social contract can stand stronger. When SC 
involves flexible bridging networks (formal and informal), an overall unified identity formation that 
is not at the expense of marginalisation, as well as a general sustainable trust within the population 
and between the people and the government, then the social contract can stand stronger. When the 
situation in a society does not have enough, or any of these, elements, and HT puts enough pressure 
on the society, then the social contract can be stretched far enough to dissolve the society. In such 
an extreme case, the society dissolves as the social dynamics that the social contract is based upon, 
is eroded. Besides the extreme cases, we can recognise that HT puts pressure on society in different 
ways to varying degrees. Even without HT, unfavourable governance and SC in a society already 
expose many negative consequences for those entities in that society – they put pressure on the 
foundations of democracy as explained through Wigell’s four features of democracy.  
As mentioned in chapter 3 on the MCDC-report, vulnerabilities and critical functions can 
involve a wide range of activities and entities. Further, any vulnerabilities and critical functions can 
become a target for a HT attacker. It is not limited by governance and SC. If we look at the 
vulnerabilities in phase one in the MCDC-report’s analysis of the Ukraine case “reliance on Russian 
gas and debt to Russia” does pose a challenge to counter such HT. However, the argument here is 
that as governance and SC constitute the fundamentals of social relations in society, these two 
concepts play a role in the severity of vulnerabilities. If the vulnerability in case was poor 
infrastructure or something else that could be solved with physical and/or economical resources 
then it is much easier to fix such vulnerabilities if the governance and SC situation is strong in the 
society. However, if the governance and SC situation is poor and distributing physical and/or 
economical resources is challenging due to corruption and/or conflicting interests, then the ability to 
fix vulnerabilities is much more challenging. Even more so is the case if (which HT often is) the 
vulnerability being targeted is directly the issue of poor governance and SC, such as in the Ukraine 
case.  
In summary, a society’s ability to respond to HT is, among other, determined by its internal 
political and social conflicts together the low efficiency and functionality in its public institutions. It 
seems how power-relationships, accountability, together with how networks and civilian-public 
relations function can have consequences for the efficiency of responses to HT and, thus, the 
efficiency of the HT conducted. With governance and SC effecting the ability and capability of 
resilience towards HT, it seems important to be able to assess and evaluate the governance and SC 







5.5 Assessing governance and social capital in HT 
In hope of answering the research question in this thesis, this section will present a set of 
questions as a suggestion for how to assess a society’s governance and SC situation. The questions 
will work as indicators to give an idea of the situation, which can then be used as a baseline 
assessment, contributing to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to expose a society’s possible 
vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT. The idea is that a deeper understanding of 
the societal and civilian aspects in HT might give a better understanding and ability to counter HT. 
Chapter 2 mentioned it is difficult to measure SC. To measure governance and SC in the 
context of HT is complex. What good governance and SC is varies in each society and different 
styles of governance and situations in SC may work differently for different societies. This means 
that assessing these two concepts, requires an assessment that takes into account the perceptions and 
socio-political history in each society in case study. It also implies an understanding of how such 
perceptions may change over time. If we are to create baseline assessment for governance and SC 
that can contribute to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework, we need to establish some ground 
ideas for what we are looking for in relation to who we are assessing. As governance and SC are 
social concepts, the perceptions of these can change over time. This has implications for how we 
can assess a society through these concepts, as well as the effects of HT. The suggested questions 
for assessing a society are based on this and focus on what those entities involved perceive instead 
of set factors for what good governance and SC implies. The questions are therefore formulated 
based on three notions/principles: 
1) The descriptions/definitions of governance and SC in this thesis do not limit or describe 
any particular type of governance and SC. Instead, they are oriented towards how 
societies are steered in decision making, their level of accountability, and how society is 
able to coordinate certain tasks in order to function as a society based on how they are 
structured in terms of social relations. 
2) Thus, we acknowledge that different styles of governance and situations in SC may work 
differently for different societies, and therefore we can’t prescribe in a black/white 
manner what is good and what is bad governance and SC. 
3) Further, this means that we are assessing the governance and SC situation based on the 
entities’ (in this society) perception and relation to the situation as well as how this may 
develop over time. 
Throughout this thesis, we have seen how a society’s governance and SC situation can in 
two ways expose a society’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards HT. Based on the findings 
through the case study, the following questions are suggested for how to assess a society’s 





1. To what degree are the power-relationships in the society viewed as favourable by the 
different entities (e.g. government, military, and the people) in it? 
a. What makes it favourable or not favourable? 
b. Has there been a change in this perception in recent years, if so why? 
2. To what degree are decision makers and the entities (including the people, private sector, 
public sector etc.) involved in the society held accountable for their actions, i.e. what is the 
degree of the society’s accountability (vertically and horizontally)? 
a. Is the situation perceived as favourable by the entities in it, and why so? 
b. Has there been a change in this perception in recent years, if so why? 
3. To what degree do the entities in the society feel a functional and emotional ownership to 
their society? 
a. Is the situation perceived as favourable by the entities in it, and why so? 
b. Has there been a change in this perception in recent years, if so why? 
 
Social capital: 
1. Do the entities in the society mostly rely on formal or informal networks to mobilise and 
function in society (on macro, meso, and micro level), and to what extent are these networks 
based on bonding, bridging, and linking SC? 
a. How so and why? 
b. Is the situation perceived as favourable by the entities? 
c. Has here been a change in the situation in recent years, if so why? 
d. Has there been a change in this perception in recent years, if so why? 
2. Does the society contain different entities with different collective identities based on, but 
not limited to; language, religion, ethnicity, territory, and/or history? 
a. If yes, do they cause any tensions in the society? 
b. If they do cause any tensions, why? 
c. How is the situation perceived by the different entities in society? 
d. What identity policies does the society have and how does it affect the situation? 
e. Has the situation changed in recent years, how? 
3. To what degree do the entities in the society trust each other, across formal and informal 
networks? 
a. Has here been a change in the situation in recent years, if so why? 




The questions above are meant as a guideline. As societies differ, certain questions may 
need to be tailored to fit the case in accordance to what the specific focus is in each assessment. In 
addition, these questions are designed through the aspect of democratic governance due to the focus 
of this thesis. Other questions may be necessary if the assessment regards an authoritarian regime. 
Moreover, further research on governance and SC in the context of HT could give more depth to 
how these questions can be developed, and how the questions may correlate more directly to 
specific HT tactics and strategies. Such research is beyond the scope of this thesis. The point here is 
that these questions could be developed to work as a guideline to create a baseline assessment for 
governance and social capital, contributing to the MCDC-report’s framework to further expose a 
society’s vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT.  
The next step is to assess the governance and SC situation in the context of HT. Here we can 
follow the MCDC-report’s idea of creating a baseline assessment, which allows for an identification 
and separation of what is a normal situation from what is likely an attack. Below, is a suggestion to 
how a baseline assessment could be developed (following the MCDC-report’s analytical 
framework). 
1. Find out how the current situation is based the guideline questions. 
2. Identify possible scenarios that could worsen the situation, i.e. make the situation more 
unfavourable to the entities in the society 
3. Identify what threats and actions could lead to such scenarios 
4. Establish how to identify the sources and reasons behind any changes in the situation, 
are the changes due to internal decisions (the society’s own policies) or from external 
pressures (an actor outside the society). This involves establishing how to determine 
where the sources of change come from  
5. Establish a system that can monitor the severity of an attack and inform on possible 
counteractions to deal with different scenarios of threats and actions 
Creating such baseline assessments and systems for countering HT, and factoring 
governance and SC into it, requires a lot of analysis into one’s own society and dealing with all the 
challenges (as mentioned earlier in section 5.2, page 53-54). Just as mentioned in page 54, how 
these questions are answered can also be influenced by the governance and SC situation. 
Nevertheless, to understand how HT affect and play on societal vulnerabilities we need to 
understand how societies and the social relations in societies work. As HT occurs across the entire 
spectrum of society, it also needs to be understood and dealt with through the entire spectrum of 
society. Different entities in society, from different public institutions not limited to government 
and military, but also private actors and civilian agencies need to be involved. Societies on the 




and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is also suggested in the MCDC-report on 
recommendations (Cullen and Reichborn-Kjennerud 2016b:23-25). HT expands the “theatre of war 
and threats” from the battlefield and into society, arguably, more intensely than before. Developing 
guideline questions and baseline assessments for the concepts governance and SC situation in a 
society could thus, prove to be a valuable asset in understanding and countering HT. As mentioned, 
the questions and points in this section of the chapter are just suggestions. Further testing and 
development of these, require more research, which is beyond the limits of this thesis. Nevertheless, 































CHAPTER SIX – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis, aimed at gaining an understanding of how the concepts of governance and social 
capital can contribute to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to further expose a society’s 
vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards hybrid threats. In this research, three main 
concepts are at the centre: 1) hybrid threats, 2) governance, and 3) social capital. In section 6.2, is a 
summary of the chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4. The summary of chapter 5 and conclusion of this thesis is 
given in section 6.3. 
 
6.2 Summary 
Chapter 2 looked at the three main concepts in this thesis: 1) hybrid threats, 2) governance, 
and 3) social capital (SC). Hybrid threats (HT) is described by the European Centre of Excellence 
for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) as “methods and activities that are targeted towards 
vulnerabilities of the opponent”. The chapter argued for using the concept HT because this thesis 
focuses on the non-kinetic aspects of conflict. In relation to the topic of this thesis, HT is relevant 
because of the focus on targeting vulnerabilities in society. While, mixing various military and non-
military elements and activities, as well as exploiting vulnerabilities in society is nothing new in the 
history of warfare, the concept HT has led to a further focus on the societal and civilian aspects of 
war and conflict. Understanding how society functions and how different societal features can in 
certain circumstances become vulnerabilities, may prove be a valuable asset in understanding and 
countering HT. One method in doing so, which is the main topic of this thesis, is to assess society 
through governance and social capital. 
Governance is about the structure of societies. It encompasses how power and decision-
making is exercised through how rules, structures, processes and relations between entities within a 
society interact. Governance can be viewed through power-relationships between the entities 
involved in it (how power is shared and exercised), and through the accountability in the system 
(how decision makers and other entities involved are accountable to each other and how this can 
facilitate legitimacy and ownership within the society). 
Social capital (SC) is about the features of social relations based on networks, identity 
formation, and trust, which have an effect on the efficiency of coordinated actions through social 
relations in a society. By “the efficiency of coordinated actions”, we mean how society is able to 
coordinate certain tasks in order to function as a society. If networks are weak, identity formation 
within a society is fragmented and is a source of tension, and/or if trust between people is low, then 




In chapter 3, we see how the MCDC-report’s description of HW is quite similar to the 
Hybrid CoE’s description and characteristics of HT. They both highlight: 1) societal vulnerabilities, 
and 2) coordinated and synchronised actions using various elements/instruments of power. In 
addition, the MCDC-report mentions the characteristic of effects and non-linearity, which is also 
the case in HT. The MCDC-report’s description offers a functional definition of HT, which forms 
the basis of their analytical framework. The framework highlights the connections and visualisation 
of the relations between vulnerabilities, instruments of powers, and effects. The framework makes it 
easier for us to create a baseline and a system for monitoring potential vulnerabilities, distinguish a 
“normal” situation versus a HT attack, the severity of an attack, and possibly how to counter it. The 
limitation of the analytical framework is not that it doesn’t put societal vulnerabilities into focus, 
but that it lacks deeper analysis for how society (represented through their PMESII spectrum) 
functions and how certain characteristics in society make the critical functions more susceptible to 
vulnerabilities, which can be targeted in HT. This adds to the argument for looking into governance 
and social capital to understand societal vulnerabilities.  
In chapter 4, we found that Ukraine has several challenges in terms of governance and SC. 
With regional divisions, tensions in national identities, polarising identity policies (centred on 
language), together with corruption and inefficient public management, the situation of governance 
and social capital was easy for Russia to exploit in its operations in Crimea and east Ukraine. Russia 
actively exploited the divisions in Ukrainian society and the unequipped government using a 
multitude of instruments from economic leverage to special forces and disinformation. The 
Ukrainian government and its military was inefficient in its response to Russia’s hybrid attacks. 
Although they eventually managed to fight back in east Ukraine, the conflict stands unresolved 
today (as of May 2019). 
 
6.3 conclusion 
In chapter 5, the Ukraine case tells us that there are two ways in which the concepts of 
governance and SC can expose a society’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility towards HT. Firstly, the 
concepts are about society and social relations. If there are already existing challenges in a society 
and in the social relations in that society, then these can expose and influence other vulnerabilities 
in society, which can be exploited by the HT aggressor. Secondly, governance and SC influence a 
society’s ability to respond and counter HT. This affects the efficiency of HT operations and the 
extent of their effects. These two ways overlap. 
We see that democracies are particularly vulnerable to HT because they are, in contrast to 
authoritarian regimes, more open and susceptible to external influences and possible threats. 




individual rights, democracies have fewer tool, compared to authoritarian regimes, to counter HT. 
In terms of governance and SC, democracies rely on a balanced situation of power-relationships, 
which need to be upheld and maintained through accountability and fair formal networks that 
ensure a trust between the people and the government as well as other public institutions. Together 
these constitute what ownership the people have to their society - do they identify as a part of their 
society’s collective identity and do they feel ownership to how their society is steered? 
HT plays on existing imbalances of power-relationships in governance and the disruptions in 
SC in democracies to weaken the society and exert influence over it. To reduce the susceptibility 
towards HT, the targeted society needs to ensure that the societal structure and social relations 
within it is perceived as favourable by the people in it. How to do so and solve existing 
vulnerabilities is a challenging task, which will vary in each society and context. Ukraine’s ability 
to respond to the conflict was challenged by its internal political conflicts and the low efficiency 
and functionality in its public institutions. It illustrated how power-relationships, accountability, 
together with how networks and civilian-public relations function can have consequences for a 
society’s ability and efficiency in countering HT. 
In hope of answering the research question in this thesis, the thesis concluded with 
presenting a set of questions as a suggestion for how to assess a society’s governance and SC 
situation. The questions will work as indicators to give an idea of the situation, which can then be 
used as a baseline assessment, contributing to the MCDC-report’s analytical framework to expose a 
society’s possible vulnerabilities and subsequent susceptibility towards HT. The idea is that a 
deeper understanding of the societal and civilian aspects in HT might give a better understanding 
and ability to counter HT. Creating a baseline assessment for countering HT, and factoring 
governance and SC into it, requires a lot of analysis into one’s own society and dealing with all the 
challenges. Further testing and development of such a framework, requires more research, which is 
beyond the limits of this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis hopes to serve as a basis for further 
research on governance and SC in the context of HT. 
In closing remarks, it seems that HT offers a duality in the aspect of democracy. HT 
challenges democracies by exposing vulnerabilities. At the same time, it also highlights the 
principles and strengths of democracy. The health of a democratic society determines its resiliency. 
If a democratic society adheres to the democratic principles and constitute power-relationships, 
accountability, and SC that is favourable to the people, then it may be resilient and function in a 
manner that reduces susceptibility to HT. If not, the democratic society, in the extreme case, risks 
collapsing under its own weight. HT is then merely a catalyst. HT can thus be viewed as one of 
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